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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND 
SOVEREIGN DEBT 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier∗ 
 
The law of foreign sovereign immunity changed dramatically 
over the course of the 20th century. The United States abandoned the 
doctrine of absolute immunity and opened its courts to lawsuits by 
private claimants against foreign governments. It also pursued a 
range of other policies designed to shift such disputes into litigation or 
arbitration (and thus relieve political actors of pressure to intervene 
on behalf of disappointed creditors). This Article uses a unique data 
set of sovereign bonds to explore how international financial con- 
tracts responded to these legal and policy initiatives. 
The Article makes three novel empirical and analytical contribu- 
tions. The first two relate to the law of sovereign immunity and to the 
role of legal enforcement in the sovereign debt markets. First, al- 
though the decision to abandon the absolute immunity rule was a ma- 
jor legal and policy shift, this article demonstrates that investors dis- 
missed their new enforcement rights as irrelevant to the prospect of 
repayment. Second, the ongoing Eurozone debt crisis has prompted 
fears that private investors will use litigation to prevent debt restruc- 
turings necessary to revive European economies. This Article shows 
that such fears may be overblown and, in the process, informs the 
broader empirical and theoretical debate about the role of legal en- 
forcement in the sovereign debt markets. 
Finally, the Article exposes a gap in contract theory as it pertains 
to boilerplate contracts such as sovereign bonds. Boilerplate presents 
a puzzle of intense interest to contracts scholars. It is drafted to serve 
the interests of sophisticated, well-resourced players, yet it often re- 
mains static in the face of new risks. To explain this inertia, contract 
theory posits that major shifts in boilerplate financial contracts re- 
quire a financial crisis or other exogenous shock that substantially al- 
ters investors’ risk perceptions. This Article, however, demonstrates 
that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 prompted a major 
shift in contracting practices despite investors’ continued indifference 
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to legal enforcement and argues that contract theory must recognize 
that a wider range of forces may prompt boilerplate to change. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sovereigns have been borrowing money—and not always repaying 
it—for thousands of years.1 For just as long, lenders have tried to ensure 
that they get their money back. Until fairly recently, private (i.e., non- 
government) lenders had two primary responses to a foreign sovereign’s 
default: They could coordinate with other lenders to impose informal 
sanctions, such as denying the borrower future loans until it resumed 
payments or negotiated an acceptable settlement. Or they could rely on 
the occasional willingness of powerful governments to force a resump- 
tion of payments through diplomatic or military means. Litigation was 
not a realistic option, for most countries granted foreign sovereigns abso- 
lute immunity from suit in national courts. 
Times have changed. Powerful countries rarely intervene directly 
on behalf of their citizens and do not use military force to protect their 
citizens’ foreign investments.2 Instead, these countries have opened their 
courts to lawsuits against foreign sovereigns. In the United States and 
 
1. See MAX WINKLER, FOREIGN BONDS: AN AUTOPSY 21–25 (Arno Press 1976) (1933) (de- 
scribing default by Greek municipalities as early as the fourth century B.C.). 
2. FEDERICO STURZENEGGER & JEROMIN ZETTELMEYER, DEBT DEFAULTS AND LESSONS 
FROM A DECADE OF CRISES 19–23 (2007). 
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United Kingdom, this happened gradually over the latter half of the 
twentieth century, as each jurisdiction abandoned the doctrine of abso- 
lute sovereign immunity. In its place, they adopted the so-called restric- 
tive theory of immunity, under which private litigants gained limited 
rights to sue foreign sovereigns in national courts and to enforce the re- 
sulting judgment. For example, foreign sovereigns are no longer immune 
from suit when they engage in commercial acts or when they have waived 
their immunity in a contract.3 
In the modern era, most sovereign lending is bond lending. And 
when countries issue bonds in foreign markets today, they almost always 
include waivers of immunity from suit and other terms designed to facili- 
tate legal enforcement.4 
This project began as an inquiry into the origins of these contract 
terms. The existing literature provides no answer, and the question is 
more complicated than it seems. A starting point might be to posit a di- 
rect link to the adoption of the restrictive theory of immunity.5 Once 
countries liberalized immunity doctrine and began to allow lawsuits 
against foreign sovereigns, an important difference between private and 
sovereign borrowers seemingly vanished. One reason private borrowers 
repay loans is because, if they do not, they can be sued and their assets 
can be liquidated to satisfy the debt. Strong legal enforcement rights 
thus help reduce the risk of default.6 Lenders to sovereign governments 
are not motivated by charity. They too should value legal enforcement 
rights and should prefer loan contracts whose terms grant them access to 
the courts.7 
Yet this answer is too simplistic. Even today, litigation against for- 
eign sovereigns is complicated by a number of legal and practical barri- 
ers, including the sovereign’s ability to shelter assets beyond the reach of 
creditors.8 Because of these barriers, investors may derive little benefit 
 
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
4. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Contracting for State Intervention: The Origins of Sovereign 
Debt Arbitration, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 335, 341–42 (2010). 
5. I am concerned with the immunity of foreign sovereigns in the courts of other countries, es- 
pecially the United States. For example, when Argentina issues bonds governed by New York law, it 
typically waives its immunity from suit in New York courts. See, e.g., Erik Larson, Argentina Loses 
Debt Immunity Suit in U.K. Supreme Court, Reversing Ruling, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 6, 2011, 10:11 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-06/argentina-loses-debt-immunity-suit-in-u-k-supreme- court-
reversing-ruling.html. 
6. See STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 2, at 31–32; see also Jeremy Bulow & 
Kenneth Rogoff, Sovereign Debt: Is to Forgive to Forget?, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 43, 49 (1989) (conclud- 
ing that small countries lacking a reputation for repayment must grant legal rights to creditors in order    
to obtain loans). 
7. See G. R. Delaume, Jurisdiction of Courts and International Loans: A Study of Lenders’ 
Practice, 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 189, 205 (1957) (inferring “the intention of American bankers to assimilate 
as far as can be done government and private loans”). 
8. As an example, many lawsuits and arbitration claims arising out of Argentina’s 2001 default  
are still pending, without creditors recovering a cent.  Many of the claimants are extremely sophisticat-  
ed litigantstypically hedge funds that bought distressed Argentine debt at  a  steep  discount.  Al- 
though a number of court plaintiffs have recovered money judgments, Argentina has simply ignored  
them and kept its assets out of plaintiffs’ reach.  In a closely-watched recent case, an exasperated dis-  
trict judge attempted to use the court’s injunctive power to force Argentina to pay. See generally Or- 
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from contract terms that facilitate litigation.9 Moreover, if changes to 
sovereign immunity law prompted bond contracts to incorporate these 
terms, it remains unclear which changes were the important ones. In the 
United States, sovereign immunity law changed gradually over several 
decades beginning in the early 1950s, and this slow evolution may have 
influenced contracts in subtle ways. Conversely, changes to sovereign 
immunity law may have lagged behind changes to contracts. This is be- 
cause lenders may feel that they can rely on dispute resolution terms 
even when those terms are formally unenforceable. For example, a bor- 
rower concerned with its reputation for promise-keeping might honor a 
promise to arbitrate even if the doctrine of absolute immunity would 
prevent a court from compelling it to participate in the arbitration or 
from enforcing an arbitration award.10 To complicate matters further, the 
United States and other international actors spent much of the twentieth 
century encouraging private parties to rely on formal adjudication, espe- 
cially arbitration, to resolve disputes with foreign sovereigns.11 These 
policies may have influenced bond contracts even during the era of abso- 
lute immunity. 
To ask when dispute resolution terms originated, then, is to ask 
about the relationship between contracts, changes in legal doctrine, and 
shifting government policy. In the course of exploring these questions, 
this Article makes three primary contributions. In Part II, it draws on a 
data set of around 1800 bond issues to trace how dispute resolution terms 
originated and evolved over the twentieth century. Part II focuses on the 
subset of bonds that were likely to generate enforcement litigation in the 
United States (meaning, for all practical purposes, New York). This sub- 
set of around 630 bonds includes nearly all issues listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange and a large percentage of New York-law-governed 
bonds listed on other exchanges.12 I document a sudden and previously 
 
der, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., Nos. 08 Civ. 6978, 09 Civ. 1707, 09 Civ. 1708, (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 23, 2012) (No. 1:08−cv−06978−TPG), ECF No. 37. A panel of the Second Circuit affirmed that 
order, although proceedings to define the injunction’s scope and  implementation  are  ongoing.  See 
NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012). 
Another notable example involves a mass arbitration filed on behalf of approximately 70,000 
Italian holders of Argentine bonds. Again, the arbitration stems from Argentina’s 2001 default. And 
once again, the claimants are nowhere near a recovery. The arbitration tribunal has only recently de- 
cided that it has jurisdiction over the mass claim. It has not yet addressed the merits, nor have the 
claimants (assuming they prevail) begun trying to enforce the award. See generally Abaclat and Oth- 
ers v. Argentine Republic (formerly Giovanna a Beccara and Others v. Argentine Republic), ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011), http://www.iareporter. 
com/downloads/20110810/download; Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic (formerly Giovanna a 
Beccara and Others v. Argentine Republic), ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5, Decision on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility (Oct. 28, 2011) (Abi-Saab, Prof., dissenting), http://italaw.com/documents/Abaclat_ 
Dissenting_Opinion.pdf. 
9. Because bonds are actively traded in secondary markets (at least today) I will often use the 
term investors, rather than lenders, to distinguish them from banks that make direct loans or under- 
write the issuance of bonds. 
10. See infra note 29. 
11. See infra Part II.A. 
12. See infra Part II.B. Listings on the NYSE began to dry up after the 1970s as issuers switched 
to Luxembourg and other exchanges. 
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unknown shift, which occurred in the wake of the 1976 enactment of the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) in the United States. The 
statute seemingly acted as a trigger. Before enactment, virtually no 
country’s bonds included terms designed to facilitate legal enforcement; 
afterwards, virtually all did.13 
Part III explores this abrupt shift in contracting practices in more 
detail. At first glance, the shift implies that the FSIA was a significant 
event that marked a turning point in creditors’ enforcement rights. In 
fact, however, the shift presents a deeper puzzle. Part III presents evi- 
dence that the FSIA did not materially enhance enforcement rights. For 
one thing, sovereign immunity law had evolved by the 1950s or 1960s to 
provide many of the benefits codified by the statute, yet contracts did not 
respond. In other words, it appears that contracts reacted to codification, 
rather than to actual change in legal doctrine. 
Moreover, it seems that investors dismissed as irrelevant all twenti- 
eth-century developments in sovereign immunity law, including the in- 
troduction and passage of the FSIA. For example, I present evidence 
that secondary market prices for existing bonds did not react to the stat- 
ute.14 This suggests that investors were indifferent to the statute’s base- 
line enforcement rightsi.e., those conferred on holders of bonds al- 
ready in circulation.15 Finally, although the FSIA allowed sovereigns 
who issued new bonds to bestow additional, potentially significant, en- 
forcement rights, this did not happen. Bonds issued after the statute’s 
enactment swiftly incorporated dispute resolution clauses, but these were 
largely cosmetic provisions that left bondholders little better off than 
holders of bonds that omitted such clauses altogether. 
Part IV turns to the implications of these findings, which extend 
from our understanding of sovereign immunity law, to debates over the 
role of legal enforcement in the sovereign lending markets, to questions 
of contract theory. With respect to sovereign immunity law, there is no 
question that the shift from the absolute to the restrictive theory of im- 
munity represented a major doctrinal development. But the practical 
import of this shift is questionable, especially in the context of sovereign 
debt. Sovereign issuers have potent incentives to shelter assets and oth- 
erwise to resist efforts to recover the full value of a loan through litiga- 
tion.16 This article focuses on a window of crucial importance to the evo- 
lution of sovereign immunity lawroughly 1950 to 1980and finds little 
evidence that these legal developments mattered to investors. Indeed, 
some events that are widely viewed as fundamental to the evolution of 
 
13. Although I focus on bonds likely to give rise to enforcement litigation in New York, I docu- 
ment a similar pattern for bonds listed in London or governed by English law. These bonds swiftly 
adopted dispute resolution clauses after the State Immunity Act of 1978.  State Immunity Act, 1978, c.  
33 (U.K.). See infra text accompanying notes 131–32. 
14. See infra Part III.B. 
15. These bonds did not address the subject of sovereign immunity or establish a process for re- 
solving disputes. 
16. See infra text accompanying notes 134–41. 
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sovereign immunity lawsuch as the 1952 issuance of the Tate 
ter17seem to have passed unnoticed in the bond markets.18 
That conclusion has further implications for a significant and ongo- 
ing debate over the role of legal enforcement in the sovereign debt mar- 
kets. In modern times, litigation arising out of sovereign default is most- 
ly the domain of a few specialized and sophisticated investors—hedge 
funds that buy distressed debt at steep discounts.19 The lawsuits filed by 
these investors never fail to roil the sovereign debt markets, sparking 
claims that enforcement rights may be too strong. For example, observ- 
ers and public officials fear that litigation may prevent financially dis- 
tressed European countries from obtaining the debt relief needed to re- 
solve the ongoing sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone.20 
Given the difficulties involved in suing a sovereign, however, it is 
not clear how seriously we should take these fears. There is a large theo- 
retical and empirical literature that seeks to explain why lenders extend 
credit to sovereign borrowers. One strand of this literature presumes 
that lenders extend credit because they have the ability to penalize the 
borrower for default, including through litigation and asset seizure.21 If 
this claim is valid, it lends credence to fears that litigation may disrupt 
needed sovereign debt restructuring efforts. As Part IV explains, how- 
ever, the findings presented here suggest that a more skeptical view is 
warrantedone that assigns little significance to creditors’ ability to en- 
force a judgment by seizing sovereign assets.22 In contrast, ongoing litiga- 
tion in the New York federal courts suggests that courts might develop 
potent injunctive remedies, but it is too soon to draw conclusions.23 
Finally, the evolution of sovereign bonds described in this article 
implicates questions of contract theory. Sovereign loan transactions in- 
volve vast sums of money, sophisticated players, and contracts that are 
actively traded in secondary markets. Those inclined to take for granted 
 
17. For further discussion of the Tate Letter, see infra Part II.A.3. 
18. See infra note 234. 
19. For examples, see supra note 8. 
20. Greece’s default, combined with (possibly short-lived) victories by investors in litigation and 
arbitration, see supra note 8, has sparked fears that hedge fund litigants will disrupt restructuring ef- 
forts. See generally Michael Goldhaber, A Brave New World?, AM. LAWYER, July 1, 2012. The U.S. 
government has filed an amicus brief supporting Argentina in one prominent case, see supra note 8, 
reflecting the government’s concern over the macroeconomic consequences  of  such  litigation.  See 
Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Reversal at 5, NML Capital,  
Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105-cv(L)), 2012 WL 1150791 (stating 
that the district court’s order “could enable a single creditor to thwart the implementation of an inter- 
nationally supported restructuring plan, and thereby undermine  the  decades  of  effort  the  United  
States has expended to encourage a system of cooperative resolution of sovereign debt crises”); see     
also Anna Gelpern, Revival on the Head of a Pin: Do U Pari Passu?, CREDIT SLIPS (Apr. 6, 2012, 4:26 
PM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/04/revival-on-the-head-of-a-pin-do-u-pari-passu.html 
(suggesting that “upholding the order [against Argentina] could spell the end of the prevailing restruc- 
turing regime”). 
21. See infra Part IV.A. 
22. The findings also reveal flaws in the existing empirical work, which does not account for the 
relationship between litigation rights and the terms of sovereign bond contracts. See infra text accom- 
panying notes 264–73. 
23. See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 699 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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the efficiency of such markets might expect contracts to contain terms 
that market participants deem optimal. A more nuanced view might 
begin by recognizing that sovereign bonds are largely boilerplate and 
rarely adopt new terms. According to contract theory, major shifts in 
sovereign debt boilerplate occur primarily when prompted by govern- 
ment intervention or when an exogenous shock, such as global financial 
crisis, alters investors’ perceptions of risk and creates a demand for new 
terms.24 
These accounts, however, fail to explain the post-FSIA shift in sov- 
ereign bonds. The shift was not prompted by government pressure and 
occurred during a time of relative placidity in the sovereign debt mar- 
kets. Part IV closes by offering an explanation that augments existing 
theories of contract change.25 It suggests that, after codification, the par- 
ties involved in documenting sovereign bond deals could no longer ig- 
nore the ongoing revolution in sovereign immunity law. In this sense, the 
statute acted as a disruptive force that prevented drafters from following 
their usual contracting routines. In effect, the statute created a need to 
do something in response to the perceived change in legal environment. 
At the same time, governments do not like to cede substantial authority 
to foreign courts and may have been reluctant to agree to expansive dis- 
pute resolution clauses. Because investors remained indifferent to legal 
enforcement, drafters were able to produce watered-down clauses that 
reflected the new legal environment without prompting the issuing gov- 
ernment to demand significant concessions of its own. 
 
II. THE GREAT (OR NOT SO GREAT) SHIFT . . . 
Until around the middle of the twentieth century, the doctrine of 
absolute sovereign immunity posed a nearly insurmountable barrier to 
suit in English and U.S. courts.26 Courts applying the doctrine, for exam- 
ple, might decline jurisdiction over a lawsuit even if the sovereign had 
previously consented to be sued and waived its immunity.27 Of course, 
 
24. For discussion of contract theory in this context, see Part IV.B. 
25. See infra Part IV.B. 
26. In some jurisdictions, the principle of absolute immunity began to break down as early as the 
mid-nineteenth century.  For a general summary, see Harvard Law School Research in International  
Law, Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 451, 527–40 (Supp. 1932) 
[hereinafter, Harvard Draft Convention]. French, German, and Swiss courts, for example, enforced ex 
ante waivers of state sovereign immunity under some circumstances, though typically only when the 
loan had some connection to the forum. See id. at 548–80 (surveying different countries’ approaches); 
Delaume, supra note 7, at 203–04 & n.40. This was not the case in English and U.S. courts. See infra 
note 27. 
27. In a 1961 case, Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, the State Department’s suggestion of immunity for 
Cuba opined that an ex ante waiver of immunity “is binding only on the conscience of the sovereign  
and, once given, may be revoked at will . . . .” Memorandum for the United States [In Opposition to 
Application for Stay of Mayan Lines, S.A.], 1 I.L.M. 276, 297 (1961). This was indeed the case under 
English law, see Duff Dev. Co. v. Kelantan, [1924] A.C. 797 (H.L.); Kahan v. Pakistan Fed’n, [1951] 2 
K.B. 1003, 1012 (Eng.), but was less clearly so under U.S. law, which was evolving rapidly. Early U.S. 
cases, however, clearly supported the view that a sovereign could withdraw its waiver of immunity  at 
any time. See Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. 527, 529 (1857). 
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this rule diminished the incentives to include dispute resolution provi- 
sions in a loan contract.28 But it may not have eliminated the incentives 
altogether. Lenders might have hoped that sovereign borrowers would 
voluntarily comply with contract terms calling for litigation or arbitra- 
tion.29 In addition, lenders might have included dispute resolution terms 
in loan contracts in response to a range of government policies. 
 
A. The Effort to Influence Loan Contracts: A Century of Trying . . . 
Throughout the twentieth century, governments and other interna- 
tional actors took steps to promote the use of formal adjudication. Their 
efforts included developing model arbitration clauses for sovereign loans, 
erecting multinational treaties to support international arbitration, mak- 
ing non-statutory changes to sovereign immunity law, and, ultimately, 
passing statutes adopting the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 
This section provides a truncated summary of these efforts and explains 
how they served to shelter domestic political actors from the costs associ- 
ated with private citizens’ foreign investments. 
 
1. Modeling Arbitration 
Perhaps the earliest efforts involve providing model arbitration 
clauses for use in loan contracts. In the early twentieth century, the 
United States and other states invested significant political capital in an 
effort to create a system of interstate arbitration.30 The details of those 
efforts are of only peripheral interest here.31 Of more direct interest are 
post-World War I loans arranged under the auspices of the League of 
Nations. After the war, a number of European countries were effectively 
shut out of global capital markets and were forced to borrow under the 
 
 
28. See generally Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 336 (noting that during the period of absolute 
immunity, “states typically were immune from suit unless they consented at the time of the lawsuit 
itself. Since any dispute-resolution process would require the sovereign’s ex post consent, there would 
seem little point to bargaining over such a process ex ante”). 
29. It is possible (if unlikely) that concern for its reputation would induce a sovereign to comply 
with such promises. Sovereign defaults can be strategic in the sense that the sovereign is technically 
capable of repaying the loan, although the domestic political costs of doing so may be unacceptable or 
prohibitive. In these cases, extra-legal sanctions have already failed to prevent default, so why would 
they induce compliance with promises related to dispute resolution? One possibility is that a borrow- 
er’s reputation for promise-keeping is independent of its reputation for loan repayment. A borrower 
could always claim—more or less plausibly—that it could not repay the loan. But no such claim could 
be made if it refused to participate in the dispute resolution process. For general discussion of the 
possibility that states possess multiple reputations, see generally George W. Downs & Michael A. 
Jones, Reputation, Compliance, and International Law, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S95 (2002); Rachel Brew- 
ster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 231, 259–62 (2009). 
30. See MARK WESTON JANIS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 123–24 (5th ed. 2008); ROBERT H. WIEBE, 
THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877–1920, at 260–62 (1967) (describing the popularity among Americans of 
the idea of international arbitration as a means for peace and the efforts of the Taft Administration to 
negotiate international arbitration treaties). See also infra note 36. 
31. For a more extensive treatment, see FRANCIS ANTHONY BOYLE, FOUNDATIONS OF WORLD 
ORDER: THE LEGALIST APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: 1898–1922, at 25–56 (1999). 
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League’s auspices.32 The League was heavily involved in shaping the 
terms of these “League Loans,” in part because some loans were guaran- 
teed by member states.33 And the loan documents often included arbitra- 
tion clauses.34 
These clauses were designed primarily to resolve interstate disputes, 
not disputes between private lenders and sovereign borrowers.35 But the 
clauses also may have been viewed as models for bankers to use in re- 
solving their own disputes with borrower governments.36 For example, 
there is evidence that banks involved in the League Loans later em- 
ployed similar clauses in loans to Brazil (by Rothschild) and Argentina 
(by JP Morgan) in the 1920s.37 
By the mid-1930s, League of Nations officials had launched a more 
formal effort to encourage the use of arbitration to resolve disputes be- 
tween private lenders and sovereign borrowers.38 A 1935 resolution 
sponsored by the Netherlands created the Committee for the Study of 
International Loan Contracts.39 The committee was comprised of leading 
figures from central banks, international financial institutions, and pri- 
vate bondholder associations.40 It was charged with drafting model con- 
tract terms for government loans, and it responded by promulgating a 
model arbitration clause.41 
The committee took pains to distinguish its proposal from earlier 




32. The United States was not a League member, but the State Department worked indirectly 
through participating U.S. banks to collaborate on these loans. See Jeff Frieden, Sectoral Conflict and 
Foreign Economic Policy, 1914–1940, 42 INT’L ORG. 59, 77–78 (1988). 
33. On League Loans generally, see Margaret G. Myers, The League Loans, 60 POL. SCI. Q. 492 
(1945). For contemporaneous history, see generally Arthur Salter, The Reconstruction of Austria, 2 
FOREIGN AFF. 630 (1924); Arthur Salter, The Reconstruction of Hungary, 5 FOREIGN AFF. 91 (1926). 
34. See Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 350; W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Reforming Sovereign Lend- 
ing Practices: Modern Initiatives in Historical Context, in SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND 
BORROWING 7–9 (Carlos Esposito et al. eds., 2013). 
35. See Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 340. 
36. A bit later in the century, U.S. policy makers involved in the creation of the International 
Monetary Fund would propose a compulsory arbitration mechanism for adjusting the debt of member 
states in default. See MARGARET G. DE VRIES & J. KEITH HORSEFIELD, THE INTERNATIONAL 
MONETARY FUND 1945–1965: TWENTY YEARS OF INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COOPERATION, 
VOLUME II: CHRONICLE 77 (J. Keith Horsefield ed., 1969). On the U.S. efforts in this regard, see gen- 
erally Eric Helleiner, The Mystery of the Missing Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism, 27 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO POL. ECON. 91, 98–104 (2008). 
37. The clauses appeared only in the underlying loan contract between the banks and the bor- 
rower, not in the bonds, and were worded so as to exclude bondholder claims. The clauses also appear 
to have been exceptional and did not appear in other loan contracts used by these banks during the 
era. See generally Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 342–50. For an example of a 1920s loan contract con- 
taining an arbitration clause, see Loan Contract Dated May 25, 1925 Between Argentina & J.P. Mor- 
gan & Co. & The National City Company, § 5 (on file with author). 
38. For further discussion, see Weidemaier, supra note 34, at 6–9. 
39. LEAGUE OF NATIONS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LOAN CONTRACTS 5 (1939) [hereinafter REPORT ON LOAN CONTRACTS]. 
40. See id. at 5–6. 
41. Id. at 5. 
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treaty resolved disputes between investors and foreign governments.42 
These earlier tribunals, the committee acknowledged, had sometimes 
been empowered to restructure rather than enforce the government’s ob- 
ligations.43 By contrast, the committee emphasized that its model clause 
contemplated a proceeding in which arbitrators would “declar[e] . . . the 
rights and obligations of the parties” rather than order “modifications of 
the contract.”44 In other words, the committee was proffering a tool for 
enforcing sovereign debt obligations, not restructuring them. 
The accompanying report expressed the optimistic view that most 
disputes arising from sovereign default could “have been easily settled, if 
it had been possible to lay them before a tribunal” like the one the com- 
mittee proposed.45 The implication was that both lenders and borrowers 
would benefit from a system of arbitration and would eagerly embrace 
the new clause.46 Time would prove otherwise.47 
 
2. Promoting International Arbitration in General 
Two mid-century multilateral treaties also can be seen as efforts to 
encourage lenders and sovereign borrowers to make use of arbitration. 
Although it did not address the unique problems arising from transac- 
tions with sovereign states, the New York Convention, which entered in- 
to force in 1959, sought to facilitate the enforcement of international ar- 
bitration agreements and awards.48 And in 1966, the creation of the 
International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) 
offered a potential mechanism for resolving investment disputes with 
 
42. These tribunals often (though not always) declined to exercise jurisdiction over bondholder 
claims on the theory that states traditionally had declined to extend diplomatic protection to citizens 
who had purchased bonds issued by foreign countries. See, e.g., Award of Sir Frederick Bruce, Bond 
Cases, reprinted in 4 HISTORY AND DIGEST OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS TO WHICH THE 
UNITED STATES HAS BEEN A PARTY 3591, 3614–15 (1898). For a summary of U.S. executive agree- 
ments with respect to arbitration commissions, see Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, The Dangers of Deference: 
International Claim Settlement by the President, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 26–27 & n.176 (2003). 
43. A 1904 protocol between the United States and Dominican Republic, for example, estab- 
lished a lump sum to be paid to the San Domingo Improvement Company (a U.S. investor) and creat- 
ed an arbitration tribunal to determine the terms on which this sum would be paid: principal and inter- 
est payments, security for the payment stream, etc. See Arbitration of the Claim of the San Domingo 
Improvement Company Against the Dominican Republic, in PAPERS RELATED TO THE FOREIGN 
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 270 (Washington: Government Printing Office 1905). 
44. REPORT ON LOAN CONTRACTS, supra note 39, at 27. 
45. Id. at 25. 
46. Indeed, the committee’s primary concern was that too much litigation might ensue. See id. at 
33 (“Too many lawsuits would be a bad thing; not only would they be unpleasant for the debtors, but 
their Stock Exchange effects would be disastrous.”). 
47. See infra Figure 1. For evidence that contracts generally did not adopt the new terms used in 
the League Loans, see Weidemaier, supra note 34, at 20–21. 
48. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and  Enforcement  of  Foreign  Arbitral  
Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 49 [hereinafter New York Convention]. The Convention entered 
into force in the United States in 1970. In addition, beginning after the second world war, the United 
States negotiated bilateral friendship, commerce, and navigation treaties, and these often waived any 
immunity to which state-owned enterprises might have been entitled. See John F. Coyle, The Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in the Modern Era, 51 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 302, 337–41 
(2013). 
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sovereign states.49 Neither development erased the uncertainty associat- 
ed with litigation against a sovereign. The New York Convention, for 
example, does nothing to lift a sovereign’s immunity from suit or execu- 
tion,50 and ICSID’s Article 55 explicitly preserves any immunity from ex- 
ecution available to the sovereign.51 Each development, however, in- 
creased the salience of international arbitration and might plausibly have 
led lenders to demand the inclusion of arbitration clauses in loan con- 
tracts. 
 
3. The Evolution of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Law 
In many respects, the most significant change occurred in 1952 when 
the U.S. Department of State issued the Tate Letter, which announced 
the Department’s adoption of the restrictive theory of sovereign immuni- 
ty as a matter of policy.52 Foreign states henceforth would retain immun- 
ity for their “public” but not for their “private” (i.e., commercial) acts.53 
The State Department, however, retained a central role in making im- 
munity determinations.54 To claim immunity, foreign states typically 
sought a suggestion of immunity from the Department.55 If the Depart- 





49. See Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of 
Other States, at art. 53–55, Oct. 14, 1966 [hereinafter ICSID Convention]. ICSID does not create an 
obligation to arbitrate–that comes either from a contract negotiated directly by the investor or from a 
bilateral investment treaty concluded by the investor’s home state and the host country. 
50. See Weidemaier, supra note 34, at 11 n.53. The FSIA provides for the enforcement of for- 
eign arbitral awards in U.S. courts. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(6)(B), 1610(a)(6) (2012). 
51. See ICSID Convention, supra note 49. There also may have been lingering uncertainty about 
whether sovereign loans constituted an “investment” eligible for arbitration before ICSID, although 
contracting parties have substantial freedom to define the term for themselves. See CHRISTOPH H. 
SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY, 125–34 (2001). 
52. See Curtis A. Bradley & Laurence R. Helfer, International Law and the U.S. Common Law 
of Foreign Official Immunity, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 213, 219 (stating that the Tate Letter “announced an 
important shift in the U.S. approach to sovereign immunity”); Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interpreting the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: Reading or Construing the Text?, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 555, 
574 (2011) (stating that the Tate Letter “inaugurat[ed] the restrictive rule of foreign sovereign immun-  
ity in American law”); Gerald L. Neuman, The Abiding Significance of Law in Foreign Relations, 2004 
SUP. CT. REV. 111, 120–21 (“The Tate Letter was so significant because during the mid-twentieth cen- 
tury the Supreme Court followed a practice of total deference to Executive  suggestions  of  immuni- 
ty.”); Ingrid Wuerth, Symposium Epilog: Foreign Sovereign Immunity at Home and Abroad, 44 VAND. 
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1233, 1235 (2011) (stating that the Tate Letter “formally articulate[d] official im- 
munity principles”). For general discussion of the evolution of sovereign  immunity  law,  see  Gary 
Born, A New Generation of International Adjudication, 61 DUKE L.J. 775, 819–25 (2012). 
53. See Jack B. Tate, Changed Policy Concerning the Granting of Sovereign Immunity to Foreign 
Governments, 26 DEP’T ST. BULL. 969, 984–85 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]. 
54. For a discussion of the Department’s view of this role, see Murray J. Belman, New Depar- 
tures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, 63 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 182, 182–87 (1969). 
55. See JANIS, supra note 30, at 359 (“Before the passage of the FSIA, the granting of immunity 
was often decided on the basis of a formal suggestion made by the Department of State.”); cf. Richard 
B. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Adviser: The State Department Lawyer and Foreign Affairs, 56 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 633, 667 n.70 (1962) (“[I]n the area of sovereign immunity . . .  a case may well be won or lost  
in the [State] Department rather than in the courtroom.”) (citations omitted). 
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final and ended any litigation that private parties had instituted in U.S. 
courts against the foreign sovereign.56 
From the standpoint of an investor  in  foreign  government  bonds, 
the Tate Letter left a number of issues unresolved, and it resolved others   
in unsatisfactory ways. For example, the issuance of bonds might have 
been treated as a public act for which the sovereign retained its immunity 
from suit in U.S. courts.57 To counter this, investors might insist that the 
bond contract include a waiver of immunity. The problem, however, was 
that the State Department or the courts might allow the issuer to with- 
draw its waiver after the fact. One 1971 case, for example, upheld the 
dismissal of a lawsuit in accordance with the State Department’s sugges- 
tion of immunity even though the foreign government had previously 
waived its immunity in a contract.58 Finally, the  Tate  Letter  addressed 
only the question of immunity from suit.59 As a matter of Department 
policy, a foreign government’s assets remained immune from execution.60 
Thus, an investor who managed to obtain a judgment had no  right  to 
seize the issuer’s U.S. assetsassuming it could find anyto satisfy the 
judgment. 
Enacted in 1976, the FSIA codified the restrictive theory of sover- 
eign immunity announced in the Tate Letter.61 As a formal matter, the 
statute changed existing law in three ways that would have been especial- 
ly relevant to investors in foreign government bonds. First, it removed 
the State Department from immunity determinations and placed that re- 
sponsibility on the courts.62 Second, it clarified that foreign governments 
were not immune from suit if they had previously waived their immunity 
in a contract, “notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the 





56. If the State Department declined to act on the suggestion, courts would decide the immunity 
question. From the 1930s until the FSIA’s enactment, courts deferred completely to State Department 
suggestions of immunity on behalf of a foreign state. See Bradley & Helfer, supra note 52, at 219; Ar- 
thur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205, 1252 (1988); 
G. Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA. L. 
REV. 1, 138−46 (1999). 
57. See Victory Transp., Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de Abastecimientos y Trasportes, 336 F.2d 354, 
360 (2d Cir. 1964). 
58. See Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir. 1971). 
59. See Tate Letter, supra note 53, at 985. 
60. See Weilamann v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469, 472–73 (Sup. Ct. 1959); Bel- 
man, supra note 54, at 186–87; Denys P. Myers, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to 
International Law, 54 AM. J. INT’L L. 632, 640–44 (1960) (describing the case and extensively quoting 
the State Department letter). 
61. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
62. A letter accompanying the draft legislation, which was jointly submitted by the Department     
of State and the Department of Justice, noted that current practice put the State Department “in the 
difficult position of effectively determining whether the plaintiff will have his day in  court.”  Letter  
from the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to the President of the Senate (Jan. 22, 1973), in 
United States: Draft Legislation on the Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 12 I.L.M. 118, 120 
(Jan. 26, 1973) [hereinafter Draft Legislation on Jurisdicitonal Immunities]. 
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of the waiver.”63 Finally, the FSIA provided judgment-holders with lim- 
ited rights to enforce a judgment against sovereign assets.64 Most nota- 
bly, property used for a commercial activity in the United States was no 
longer immune from execution if the foreign sovereign had waived im- 
munity from execution65 or, absent such a waiver, if the property “is or 
was used for the commercial activity upon which the claim is based.”66 
As a practical matter, however, the FSIA may not have represented 
a stark departure from existing law, which had continued to evolve in the 
wake of the Tate Letter. Take first the question whether a sovereign 
could irrevocably waive its immunity from suit in a contract. Even after 
the Tate Letter, the State Department seemingly viewed such waivers as 
revocable at the sovereign’s whim.67 Yet the law was clearly in flux. For 
example, a 1963 report prepared for the Department by an external re- 
searcher noted that foreign states could waive immunity by contract and 
listed only English courts as exceptions to this rule.68 The FSIA’s legisla- 
tive history also contains little hint that the decision to treat waivers of 
immunity as irrevocable represented a clear break from existing law.69 
Indeed, early drafts of the Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of 
the United States, published in 1958, took the position that such waivers 
were enforceable even when “made in advance of any enforcement ac- 
tion.”70 The accompanying comments contain no hint that the proposi- 
tion was controversial,71 and when in 1962 the proposal was finally incor- 
 
63. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).   This may have been significant, as the FSIA did not remove all   
doubt as to whether the issuance of bonds was a commercial activity. See  infra text accompanying  
notes 85–89. 
64. These rights are codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2012). 
65. Id. § 1610(a)(1). 
66. Id. § 1610(a)(2). I am omitting discussion of other relevant provisions, especially those relat- 
ed to arbitration. For example, the FSIA also allows U.S. courts to assume jurisdiction over a foreign 
sovereign to the extent necessary to enforce an arbitration agreement or confirm an arbitration award,    
id. § 1605(a)(6), and allows the holder of a judgment based on an arbitration award to execute the 
judgment against the sovereign’s commercial assets (whether or not the assets were “used for the 
commercial activity upon which the claim is based”), id. § 1610(a)(6). The FSIA’s provisions with re- 
spect to arbitration were added in the late 1980s, before sovereign bonds began to include arbitration 
clauses. 
67. See supra note 27 and text accompanying note 58. 
68. See JOSEPH M. SWEENEY, DEP’T OF STATE, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITY 55 (1963); see also Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 26, at 549 (proposing that con- 
tractual waivers of immunity be irrevocable and that this rule “seems so obviously equitable that its 
general acceptability may be assumed,” despite the English rule to the contrary). Indeed, a proposed 
draft of the FSIA, which was jointly submitted by the State Department and the Department of Jus- 
tice, recognized binding waivers of immunity even in cases involving a foreign state’s “public debt.” 
The accompanying correspondence gives no hint that this was viewed as a significant change. See 
Draft Legislation on Jurisdicitonal Immunities, supra note 62, at 124; see also Victory Transp. Inc. v. 
Comisaria Gen. de Abastecimientos y Trasportes, 336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964) (agreement to arbi- 
trate constituted submission to jurisdiction for purposes of a suit to compel arbitration). 
69. A House Report noted that “[s]ome court decisions” had allowed foreign states to withdraw 
a waiver but that “the better view” was to the contrary. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 18 (1976). 
70. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 57(1) (Tenta- 
tive Draft No. 2, 1958). 
71. Id. at cmt. b (“When a foreign state has made a contractual provision that it will not assert its 
immunity in the courts of another state there is no reason why it should not be bound by such a con- 
tractual provision.”). 
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porated into the Proposed Official Draft, the following illustration might 
have caught a bondholder’s eye: 
State A concludes a contract with private banks in state B for the 
sale of bonds issued by A. The contract provides that any dispute 
between the bondholders and A will be submitted to the courts of 
B. . . . X, a bondholder, sues A for payment in a court of B. A has 
waived its immunity in the matter and the courts of B may exercise 
their jurisdiction to determine the merits of X’s claim.72 
Well before the FSIA, then, investors arguably had reason to favor 
bonds that included waivers of immunity from suit and other clauses de- 
signed to facilitate legal enforcement. An issuer might comply with these 
clauses voluntarily even after defaulting on the loan itself.73 If not, it was 
increasingly plausible that the State Department or the courts would en- 
force its waiver and that investors could at least succeed in obtaining a 
judgment. From the State Department’s perspective, this could be ac- 
complished simply by declining to file a suggestion of immunity on the 
foreign sovereign’s behalf.74 In such a case, the court would have discre- 
tion to decide whether to enforce the waiver.75 And its decision on that 
question might well have been influenced by the growing consensus that 
such waivers were enforceable. 
Of course, that was only half the battle. A successful litigant still 
had to enforce the judgment, and State Department policy was that sov- 
ereign assets were immune from execution.76 As a formal matter, then, 
the FSIA represented a significant change from prior law regarding exe- 
cution of judgments. As a practical matter, though, the change was mod- 
est, perhaps even nonexistent. That is because, except when a sovereign 
has waived immunity from execution (or agreed to arbitrate), the FSIA 
only allows judgment holders to reach assets “used for the commercial 
activity upon which the claim is based.”77 For holders of sovereign bonds, 
this is a problem. Because the relevant commercial activity is borrowing 
money, and because sovereigns quickly spend the money they borrow,78 
 
72. RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 73 cmt. on sub- 
sec. (1), b, illus. 1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). The Reporter’s Notes acknowledged that U.S. cases 
provided no direct support for the Restatement rule but opined that U.S. courts would adopt the rule 
if the issue were to arise. Id. at cmt. on subsec. (1), reporter’s notes 1. 
73. See supra note 29. 
74. See supra note 56. 
75. Existing law suggested that courts should dismiss the case if the State Department filed a 
waiver of immunity, see Isbrandtsen Tankers v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198, 1201 (2d Cir. 1971), 
but left the court discretion to decide the immunity question if the State Department did not “recog-  
nize[] and allow[]” the foreign sovereign’s immunity claim. See  Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 24  
N.E.2d 81, 86 (N.Y. 1939); Francis Deak, The Plea of Sovereign Immunity and the New York Court of 
Appeals, 40 COLUM. L. REV. 453, 454–55 (1940). 
76. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2012). As noted earlier, supra note 66, an arbitration clause effec- 
tively constitutes a waiver of both jurisdictional immunity and immunity from execution. Like an ex- 
press waiver of immunity from execution, an arbitration clause expands the range of property that is 
subject to execution by eliminating any requirement that the property has been “used for the commer-  
cial activity” upon which the claimant based the claim. 
78. Or at minimum transport it out of the United States. 
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few assets will meet this definition. I will return to this subject below.79 
For now, the important point is that the FSIA granted meaningful execu- 
tion rights to bondholders only when the bond contained a waiver of 
immunity from executionand perhaps not even then. 
 
4. A Common Theme: Insulating Political Actors from Investment 
Disputes 
The discussion thus far may suggest that there is a unique link be- 
tween efforts to encourage formal adjudication and sovereign bond lend- 
ing. In some casesas with the League Loans and the Committee for the 
Study of International Loan Contractsthat is true.80 In others, howev- 
er, the link is more tenuous.81 The FSIA’s drafters, for example, had in 
mind a range of activities that might result in claims by U.S. citizens 
against foreign governments.82 Lending money was only one means of 
foreign investment, and not all loans involved the issuance of bonds.83 
Indeed, the Depression severely curtailed the bond markets, which re- 
mained relatively dormant until the late 1980safter passage of the 
FSIA.84 
But sovereign lending was hardly an afterthought. For example, 
early drafts of the FSIA would have allowed foreign sovereigns to assert 
immunity in lawsuits arising out of their “public debt.”85 Had they been 
adopted, these provisions would have codified the view that the issuance 
of bonds was a public (i.e., non-commercial) act.86 These controversial 
provisions were eventually deleted.87 Explaining this decision, the House 




79. See infra text accompanying notes 124–30, 157–62. 
80. The League Loan documents often included arbitration clauses, and the Committee for the 
Study of International Loan Contracts drafted a model arbitration clause for inclusion in government 
loans. See supra text accompanying notes 32–46. 
81. Neither the New York Convention nor ICSID, for example, were motivated by interest in 
resolving claims arising out of foreign government bonds. See supra text accompanying notes 48–51. 
82. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976) (providing examples of “foreign state enterprises” 
acting as “every day participants in commercial activities”). The House Report cites as examples 
“when U.S. businessmen sell goods to a foreign state trading company, and disputes may arise con- 
cerning the purchase price,” “when an American property owner agrees to sell land to a real estate 
investor that turns out to be a foreign government entity and conditions in the contract of sale may 
become a subject of contention,” and “when a citizen crossing the street may be struck by an automo- 
bile owned by a foreign embassy.” Id. at 6–7. 
83. Most lending to sovereigns in the decades after WWII took the form of direct lending by 
governments or multilateral financial institutions to debtor countries. Private lending in the 1960s and 
1970s typically involved syndicated bank loans, in which groups of banks would make direct loans to 
debtor countries. 
84. YOUSSEF CASSIS, CAPITALS OF CAPITAL: A HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL 
CENTRES, 1780–2005, at 192–93, 244 (2006). 
85. Draft Legislation on Jurisdicitonal Immunities, supra note 62, at 121. 
86. See G. R. Delaume, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity: Some Considerations Pertinent to 
S.566, 67 AM. J. INT’L L. 745, 747–49 (1973). 
87. For relevant criticism, see generally id.; G. R. Delaume, Public Debt and Sovereign Immunity 
Revisited: Some Considerations Pertinent to H.R. 11315, 70 AM. J. INT’L L. 529 (1976). 
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the U.S. public was an act “of a commercial nature . . . .”88 And anyway, 
the report’s authors concluded, the question was irrelevant. Even if 
bond issuance was a public act for which the sovereign was entitled to 
immunity, the banks that underwrote the bonds “would invariably in- 
clude an express waiver of immunity in the debt instrument.”89 The im- 
plication was clear: one way or the other, U.S. courts would adjudicate 
disputes arising out of the issuance of bonds by foreign governments. 
Thus, one of the FSIA’s functions was to channel bond disputes into 
the courts or into arbitration.90 This was not a new goal. To a degree, the 
same goal had animated earlier initiatives to promote formal adjudica- 
tion between private investors and foreign sovereigns. It is important to 
realize that these initiatives served an important (and self-serving) func- 
tion for government officials: Each promised to insulate political actors 
from pressure to intervene on behalf of domestic constituentsincluding 
bondholderswhose foreign investment hopes had been dashed. 
For example, ICSID Article 27 forbids contracting states to extend 
diplomatic protection to nationals when the relevant foreign state has 
agreed to arbitrate.91 The effect of Article 27 is to allow states to commit, 
credibly and in advance, not to intervene in investment disputes.92 By 
giving investors a remedy that does not depend on their home state’s 
willingness to espouse their claimsindeed, by prohibiting espous- 
alICSID depoliticizes investment disputes.93 Changes to sovereign 
immunity law served a similar function. By opening U.S. courts to law- 
suits against foreign states through the Tate Letter, and by removing the 
State Department from the process of making immunity determinations 
through the FSIA, the changes promised to insulate political actors from 




88. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 10 (1976). As enacted, the FSIA said nothing at all about sover-  
eign bonds, despite proposals to explicitly define commercial activity to include the issuance of “any  
debt security.” See Georges R. Delaume, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Public Debt Liti- 
gation: Some Fifteen Years Later, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 257, 259 (1994). After its enactment in 1978, the 
State Immunity Act explicitly defined commercial activities to include “any loan or other transaction    
for the provision of finance,” presumably settling the question in the U.K.   State Immunity Act, 1978,    
c. 33, § 3 (U.K.). 
89. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 10. 
90. Recall that the statute treats an arbitration clause as a waiver of immunity to the extent nec- 
essary to enforce the arbitration clause or confirm an arbitration award, and it expands the range of 
property subject to execution. See supra note 66. 
91. See Int’l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disputes [ICSID], ICSID Convention, Regulations and 
Rules, Art. 27(1) (Apr. 2006) which provides: “No Contracting State shall give diplomatic protection, 
or bring an international claim, in respect of a dispute which one of its nationals and another Contract- 
ing State shall have consented to submit or shall have submitted to arbitration under this Convention, 
unless such other Contracting State shall have failed to abide by and comply with the award rendered 
in such dispute.” Contracting states may, however, make “informal diplomatic exchanges” in an effort 
to facilitate a settlement. Id. at Art. 27(2). 
92. In turn, the state that hosts the investment benefits to the extent that it prefers arbitration to 
diplomatic and economic pressure from the investor’s home state. 
93. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Vandevelde, A Brief History of International Investment Agreements, 12 
U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 157, 175 (2005). 
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Many government officials would have welcomed some distance 
from foreign investment disputes.94 During the twentieth century, the 
U.S. government was heavily involved both in the making of foreign 
loans and in the resolution of default-related disputes.95 And that in- 
volvement proved costly.96 
Some background may help frame this point. By the 1920s, U.S. 
overseas investments were concentrated in the hands of a relatively small 
group of manufacturing and extractive industries and internationally- 
oriented banks.97 Between 1900 and 1929, foreign direct investment in- 
creased by two hundred and sixty percent as a percentage of U.S. domes- 
tic corporate and agricultural wealth, and more than half of this 
investment was concentrated in a handful of industries.98 Over the same 
period, U.S. holdings of foreign bonds increased nearly six-fold, and new 
foreign issuances came to constitute a substantial part of the New York 
market.99 Between 1919 and 1929, foreign issues constituted nearly twen- 
ty percent of all New York issues,100 and the majority of these were for- 
eign government securities.101 As a result of World War I, New York be- 
came a leading global capital market.102 
These concentrated economic sectors had an interest in securing an 
actively internationalist role for the United States and in lobbying the 
 
 
94. Governments did not routinely intervene (much less wield military force) on behalf of bond- 
holders, and many diplomatic interventions were minor and relatively costless. In fact, bondholders 
have historically been somewhat disfavored as creditors. For example, in an 1848 circular sent to Brit- 
ish diplomats, Viscount Palmerston stressed the British government’s unfettered discretion in deciding 
whether to assist British holders of foreign bonds and noted that “[t]he British Government has con- 
sidered that the losses of imprudent men who have placed mistaken confidence in the good faith of 
foreign Governments would provide a salutary warning to others.” The Palmerston Circular is quoted 
in CHARLES LIPSON, STANDING GUARD: PROTECTING FOREIGN CAPITAL IN THE NINETEENTH AND 
TWENTIETH CENTURIES 44 (1985). It is clear, however, that the U.S. government played an active role 
both in making and enforcing foreign loans, especially in the first decades of the twentieth-century. See 
generally EMILY S. ROSENBERG, FINANCIAL MISSIONARIES TO THE WORLD: THE POLITICS AND 
CULTURE OF DOLLAR DIPLOMACY, 1900–1930 (1999). 
95. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 94. On the general involvement of creditor states in  
settling default on foreign bonds, see also STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 2;  Barry 
Eichengreen, Historical Research on International Lending and Debt, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 149, 162–64 
(1991); Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, Settling Defaults in the Era of Bond Finance, 3 WORLD 
BANK ECON. REV. 211 (1989); Albert Fishlow, Lessons From the Past: Capital Markets During the 19th 
Century and the Interwar Period, 39 INT’L ORG. 383 (1985). 
96. In the early 1930s, for example, the State Department was publicly excoriated for  its  role  in 
foreign lending. See Michael R. Adamson, The Failure of the Foreign Bondholders Protective Council 
Experiment, 1934–1940, 76 BUS. HIST. REV. 479, 486–87 (2002). 
97. See Frieden, supra note 32, at 63. 
98. Id. at 64 & tbl. 1. 
99. Id. at 63–65 & tbl. 1. The increase is reported as a percentage of non-government bond is- 
sues (meaning it excludes US treasuries, municipal bonds, etc.). 
100. Id. at 66 tbl. 3 (figure excludes domestic government securities). 
101. ILSE MINTZ, DETERIORATION IN THE QUALITY OF FOREIGN BONDS ISSUED IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 1920–1930, at 19 (1951) (compare Table 3 to Table 1 on p. 9); RALPH A. YOUNG, U.S. DEP’T 
OF COMMERCE , HANDBOOK ON AMERICAN UNDERWRITING OF FOREIGN SECURITIES 12 tbl. 2 (1930). 
102. On this history generally, see BARRY EICHENGREEN,  GOLDEN  FETTERS:  THE  GOLD 
STANDARD AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION, 1919–1939, 29–67 (1992); Marc Flandreau et al., Conflicts of 
Interest, Reputation, and the Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck? 6–10 (HEID Working Pa- 
per No. 02, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1588031. 
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government to support their overseas investments more directly.103 And 
in fact, there is ample evidence that State Department officials were in- 
volved in structuring or reviewing foreign loans during the first decades 
of the twentieth century.104 This degree of involvement between political 
actors and American bankers, of course, may have implied that the U.S. 
government was assuming the obligation to protect the interests of 
American investors.105 And it generated an intense backlash after the 
wave of sovereign defaults that accompanied the Depression.106 
A state that wants no part of enforcing its citizens’ foreign invest- 
ments would do well to offer them alternatives. And in fact, the U.S. 
government pursued a number of policies designed to channel bond- 
holder claims into less costly (for political actors) enforcement devices. 
In the 1930s, for example, the State Department established the Foreign 
Bondholders Protective Council (FBPC), in part as a reaction to public 
outrage over the Department’s role in foreign lending.107 A quasi-private 
organization, the FBPC’s purpose was to represent U.S. bondholders in 
settlement negotiations with sovereigns that had defaulted.108 And if set- 
tlement negotiations failed, a viable system of arbitration or litigation 
might offer further protection from demands to intervene.109 
This truncated discussion does not do justice to the U.S. govern- 
ment’s complex involvement in foreign loans.110 But the broader point is 
simple: throughout much of the century, many government officials had 
reason to encourage the use of formal adjudication to resolve foreign in- 
vestment disputes, including those arising out of bond lending. That goal 
was pursued ambivalently and often was undermined by other policy im- 
 
103. Thomas Ferguson, From Normalcy to New Deal: Industrial Structure, Party Competition, and 
American Public Policy in the Great Depression, 38 INT’L ORG. 41, 63–79 (1984); Frieden, supra note 
32, at 62–74; LIPSON, supra note 94, at 58–64. 
104. For example, State Department officials worked with U.S. banks to design arbitration claus- 
es that would justify post-default U.S. intervention in the affairs of Latin American borrowers. See 
Weidemaier, supra note 4 at 348–49. And by the early 1920s, the State Department was reviewing all 
proposed foreign loans in an effort to balance the interests of internationally-oriented banks and in- 
dustries (which favored free trade and other policies, such as cancelation of inter-government war 
debts) and domestic manufacturers (who, supported by the Commerce Department, opposed such 
policies as a subsidy to international competitors). See Frieden, supra note 32, at 60 (“Through the 
1920s and early 1930s, the two broad coalitions battled to dominate foreign economic policy. The re- 
sult was an uneasy stand-off in which the two camps entrenched themselves in different portions of the 
state apparatus, so that policy often ran on two tracks and was sometimes internally contradictory.”). 
See generally PAUL PHILIP ABRAHAMS, THE FOREIGN EXPANSION OF AMERICAN FINANCE AND ITS 
RELATIONSHIP TO THE FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1907–1921 (1976); 
DAN P. SILVERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING EUROPE AFTER THE GREAT WAR 150–59 (1982) (discussing 
negotiations between Britain and the United States for British funding of American war debt). 
105. MELVYN P. LEFFLER, THE ELUSIVE QUEST: AMERICA’S PURSUIT OF EUROPEAN STABILITY 
AND FRENCH SECURITY, 1919–1933, at 61–64 (1979). 
106. See Flandreau et al., supra note 102, at 6–10. 
107. On the history of the FBPC generally, including its conflicted relationship with the State De- 
partment, see Adamson, supra note 96; Barry Eichengreen & Richard Portes, After the Deluge: De- 
fault, Negotiation, and Readjustment During the Interwar Years, in THE INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS 
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 12 (Barry Eichengreen & Peter H. Lindert eds., 1989). 
108. See Adamson, supra note 96, at 479, 491. 
109. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 91–94. 
110. See, e.g., ROSENBERG, supra note 94. 
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peratives.111 But loan contracts may have been influenced by these ef- 
forts. For example, even during the era of absolute immunity, U.S. 
banks might have included arbitration clauses in loan contracts because 
they knew their government favored such clauses and because they 
hoped it would intercedein the form of relatively costless diplomatic 
nudgingto the extent necessary to obtain the issuer’s participation in 
the arbitration.112 
For all of these reasons, sovereign bonds offer a unique opportunity 
to explore how contracts evolve in response to a wide array of formal 
and informal forces. These include the gradually evolving law of sover- 
eign immunity, model contract terms drafted by influential international 
actors, and government policies designed to encourage reliance on adju- 
dication even in the absence of formal enforcement rights. As the next 
section explains, however, bond contracts were largely indifferent to 
these events. When they adopted dispute resolution terms, they did so 
en masse, and seemingly in response to codification rather than to actual 
change in sovereign immunity doctrine. 
 
B. The FSIA as Trigger for Contract Change 
This section maps sovereign bond contracting practices with respect 
to dispute resolution onto the developments described above. The over- 
all data set consists of over 1800 bond contracts spanning the period 
1823–2011. This includes the set of sovereign bond offerings available as 
of 2011 from the Thomson OneBanker database, a source of modern 
bonds. Thomson OneBanker is not complete, however, and it primarily 
includes documents related to bond issuances since the mid-1990s.113 To 
supplement this data, I and others have also gathered documents from a 
variety of financial archives and libraries, primarily in New York, Wash- 
ington, DC, and London.114 This archival research expands the data set 
to include nearly every sovereign bond issuance listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange (if retained in the NYSE archives at the Library of Con- 
gress), a significant number of post-1900 issuances on the London Stock 
Exchange, and many private issuances listed on neither exchange. 
 
 
111. The State Department’s foreign policy agenda, for example, increasingly led it to interfere 
with the FBPC and eventually to supplant the FBPC altogether as chief settlement negotiator. See 
Adamson, supra note 96 at 506–12. 
112. See Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 345–52. 
113. It also contains relatively few bonds governed by local-law, which have featured rather prom- 
inently in recent discussions of sovereign debt restructuring—such as Greece’s unilateral and retroac- 
tive imposition of collective action clauses on its local-law bonds. See, e.g., Jeromin Zettelmeyer & 
Mitu Gulati, In the Slipstream of the Greek Debt Exchange, VOX (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.voxeu. 
org/article/slipstream-greek-debt-exchange. 
114. These include the New York Stock Exchange archives at the Library of Congress in Wash- 
ington, DC; the London Stock Exchange archives at Guildhall library in London; the archives for 
HSBC, Rothschild, Barings, and UBS; the stock books at the JP Morgan Library and Museum in New 
York; the Willard Straight papers at Cornell University; and the Duke University and Harvard Busi- 
ness School library archives. 
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Because I am concerned primarily with legal and policy develop- 
ments in the United States, I focus on bonds that were listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange or that were listed on another exchange but gov- 
erned by New York law.115 In either case, New York would be a likely 
forum for enforcement litigation.116 I also focus only on bonds issued by 
foreign countries and thus exclude bonds issued by cities, provinces, and 
other quasi-sovereign entities such as development banks.117 The result- 
ing subset includes 630 bonds. A more complete description of the da- 
taset and its limits is provided elsewhere,118 but the Appendix provides 
additional detail. 
Figure 1 depicts how bonds issued after 1940 and likely to be en- 
forced in New York address the subject of dispute resolution. For sim- 
plicity, the figure focuses only on two variables. The first is whether the 
bond contract includes a waiver of the sovereign’s immunity from suit.119 
The second is whether the bond contract also includes a waiver of im- 
munity from execution.120 Brazilian and El Salvadoran bonds issued after 
1990 include arbitration clauses, and I treat these as including a waiver of 
both immunity from suit and execution.121 With respect to immunity 
from suit, the figure depicts a clear shift. In the years immediately pre- 
ceding the enactment of the FSIA, only a handful of issuances included 
waivers of sovereign immunity. These bonds were a distinct minority, 
however, and most appeared after the FSIA had been introduced in 
Congress with the joint support of the State Department and the De- 
partment of Justice.122 (Five series of bonds issued simultaneously by 
Malaysia in 1965 are the sole exception.) After 1977, however, virtually 
all new issuances included a waiver of immunity from suit.123 
 
115. There is reason to believe bonds adopted dispute resolution clauses earlier in other jurisdic- 
tions where sovereign immunity law had evolved earlier to permit lawsuits against foreign states. See 
Delaume, supra note 7, at 203–04. 
116. None of the bonds in the dataset selects the law of another U.S. jurisdiction. 
117. As noted infra, dispute resolution clauses began to appear somewhat earlier in these bonds.  
See infra text accompanying notes 165–68; see also Coyle, supra note 48 (discussing impact of friend- 
ship, commerce, and navigation treaties on immunity of state-owned enterprises). 
118. See generally Mark Weidemaier et al., Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 
38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 72 (2013); W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, How Markets Work: The 
Lawyer’s Version, STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY (forthcoming 2013). 
119. Such a waiver is always accompanied by a clause submitting to the jurisdiction of foreign 
courts or (in rare cases) providing for arbitration. 
120. Thus, the figure omits a good deal of information, including the location of the chosen forum, 
whether the contract includes a choice of law clause, and other variables. Not surprisingly, some of 
these variables are strongly related. As a general rule, for example, sovereign bonds provide for litiga- 
tion in the jurisdiction whose law governs the issuance. In the full dataset of 1862 bonds, 1135 contain 
both a choice of law clause and a choice of forum clause, and in 98.9 percent of these issuances (1122 
of 1135), the chosen law matches the selected jurisdiction (although the issuer sometimes agrees that it 
may also be sued elsewhere). In the mid-1990s, a few issuers began to include arbitration clauses in 
their bonds, either in lieu of or in addition to clauses submitting to foreign court jurisdiction. On these 
clauses generally, see W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boilerplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
121. See supra text accompanying note 66. 
122. See Draft Legislation on Jurisdicitonal Immunities, supra note 62, at 118. The first draft of 
the legislation that became the FSIA was introduced in the Senate in January, 1973. See id. 
123. Many of the exceptions involve Latin American issuers who had long sought to channel for- 
eign investors into their local courts. According to the Calvo Doctrine, foreign creditors who held 
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Like other boilerplate contracts, sovereign bonds rarely adopt new 
terms.124 For that reason alone, this shift was a significant contracting 
event.125 At the same time, its practical impact was limited. Note that, in 
the immediate wake of the FSIA, no issuer waived its immunity from ex- 
ecution.126 Such waivers did not become common until the mid-1990s, 
and they did not begin to appear in the New York market until after 
Mexico’s suspension of payments in August of 1982 prompted the 1980s 
debt crisis.127 The omission is significant. As noted above, it is not clear 
that the FSIA meaningfully enhanced bondholders’ enforcement rights 
in the absence of a waiver of immunity from execution.128 This is be- 
cause, without the waiver, bondholders could only hope to seize com- 
mercial assets that had been “used for the commercial activity upon 
which” they had based their claimsi.e., used for the issuance of 






defaulted sovereign debt should submit their claims to local (debtor country) courts rather than rely       
on the protections of foreign governments. See Ryan J. Bubb & Susan Rose-Ackerman, BITs and 
Bargains: Strategic Aspects of Bilateral and Multilateral Regulation of Foreign Investment, 27 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 291, 294 (2007). 
124. See Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An Empirical 
Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 932 & n.7 (2004) (discussing assumption of 
standardization in sovereign bond contracts). 
125. See infra Part IV.B. 
126. A modern bond, for example, might provide something like: 
To the extent that the Republic may in any jurisdiction claim or acquire for itself or its assets im- 
munity (sovereign or otherwise) from suit, execution, attachment (whether in aid of execution, be- 
fore judgment or otherwise) or other legal process (whether through service or notice or other- 
wise), the Republic irrevocably agrees for the benefit of the Holders of Notes not to claim, and 
irrevocably waives, such immunity, to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction. 
MERRILL LYNCH INT’L, U.S. $22,000,000,000 THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC GLOBAL MEDIUM-TERM 
NOTE PROGRAM 104 (2009) (emphasis added). By contrast, bonds issued in the late-1970s typically 
waived only the sovereign’s immunity from suit. For example, bonds issued by Finland in 1977 pro-  
vide: 
Finland will irrevocably waive any immunity from jurisdiction to which it might otherwise be enti- 
tled in any action arising out of or based on the Bonds which may be instituted by any holder of a 
Bond in any State or Federal court in New York City or in any competent court in Finland. 
REPUBLIC OF FIN. 8.75% BONDS DUE 1992, PROSPECTUS (1977). 
127. On the timing of the crisis, see Eduardo Borensztein & Ugo Panizza, The Costs of Sovereign 
Default 7 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/08/238, 2008). See generally Ugo Panizza et 
al., The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 651, 669 fig. 1 
(2009). 
128. See supra text accompanying notes 76–78. 
129. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (2012). 
130. If the issuing country had assets in another jurisdiction, if that jurisdiction had more favora- 
ble rules with respect to execution against sovereign property, and if that jurisdiction would recognize 
and enforce the judgment of a U.S. court, then the bondholder might have broader enforcement 
rights. Likewise, it is conceivable that a creditor holding a judgment could seize the proceeds of a new 
loan contracted in the United States, which would be a more potent enforcement right. But this would 
require a court to conclude that the new loan “is or was used for the commercial activity upon which 
the claim is based”—i.e., “used for” the old loan. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2). The creditor’s argument 
would be strengthened if the issuer intended to devote some of the new loan proceeds to satisfying 
claims of holders of the old (i.e., defaulted) bonds. But even this seems a stretch of the statutory lan- 
guage. 
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FIGURE 1: 
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY TRANSITION IN NEW YORK 
 
Although I am primarily interested in bonds issued in New York or 
governed by New York law, these bonds are not unique. A similar shift 
took place in bonds that were likely to give rise to enforcement litigation 
in England.131 These bonds quickly incorporated waivers of immunity in 
the wake of the State Immunity Act of 1978, which codified the restric- 
tive theory of immunity in the United Kingdom.132 Across a wide spec- 
trum of sovereign bonds, then, codification of the restrictive theory of 
immunity seemingly acted as a trigger prompting the wholesale inclusion 






131. This includes bonds governed by English law or listed on the London Stock Exchange. 
132. See generally State Immunity Act, 1978, c. 33 (U.K.). Note that there are a number of im- 
portant differences between the two jurisdictions that I do not explore here. For instance, waivers of 
immunity from execution began to appear earlier in London and now comprise the vast majority of 
English-law bonds. By contrast, in the New York market, waivers of immunity from execution did not 
become common until the 1990s.  Even today, in fact, bonds governed by New York law are less likely  
to include such waivers, and it is not uncommon for the same issuer to include a waiver in its English- 
law but not its New York-law bonds. For example, disclosure documents from roughly contempora- 
neous bonds issued by Australia, Finland, Portugal, South Africa, and Turkey report that English-law 
bonds contain a waiver of immunity from execution but do not report such a waiver in New York-law 
bonds. 
133. As noted, see supra note 120, Figure 1 omits a good deal of information. Waivers of immuni- 
ty, however, were (and are) always paired with choice of forum clauses, and virtually always with 
choice of law clauses. As with waivers of immunity, choice of law and choice of forum clauses were 
largely absent from sovereign bonds before the FSIA and SIA. 
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III. THE IRRELEVANCE OF LEGAL ENFORCEMENT 
Why would contracts have changed so suddenly in the wake of the 
FSIA? The statute does not guarantee creditors meaningful relief.134 
The sovereign may not keep assets in the enforcing jurisdiction or may 
remove assets in anticipation of being sued.135 Judgment  creditors  thus 
tend to recover only if sovereigns willingly pay the judgment.136 But a 
country that has defaulted on its bond debt has no incentive to pay vol- 
untarily. In fact, its incentives are quite the opposite. Because there is no 
sovereign bankruptcy mechanism,137 a financially-distressed  sovereign 
must persuade a supermajority of bondholders to accept a restructuring 
plan.138 This results in familiar coordination problems in which individual 
creditors may hold out in hope of a better deal.139 Given this dynamic, it 
would make no sense to pay successful litigants voluntarily; doing so 
would encourage holdouts and potentially derail the restructuring.140 For 
this reason, sovereign issuers fiercely resist attempts to use the courts to 
recover defaulted sovereign bond debt.141 
 
134. See George K. Foster, Collecting from Sovereigns: The Current Legal Framework for Enforc- 
ing Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments Against States and Their Instrumentalities, and Some Pro- 
posals for Its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 665, 667 (2008) (“In the United  States alone, there 
have been more than 200 reported court cases filed against foreign  sovereigns  since  2004 . . . .  Yet,  if 
history is any guide, few of these parties will succeed in enforcing any judgments they may obtain.”). 
135. STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 2, at 55–57; William W. Bratton & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Sovereign Debt Reform and the Best Interest of Creditors, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1, 11 (2004). 
136. Awards granted by an ICSID (International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes) 
tribunal, for example, have historically been voluntarily satisfied in most cases. See Foster, supra note 
134, at 704. 
137. Anna Gelpern, Bankruptcy, Backwards: The Problem of Quasi-Sovereign Debt, 121 YALE. 
L.J. 888, 890 (2012). 
138. William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed Sovereign’s Rational Choices, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 823 (2004); David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do it All?, 52 EMORY L.J. 417 
(2003).  This assumes the sovereign restructures through the use of collective action clauses, which is   
not always the case. See, e.g., Ran Bi et al., The Problem That Wasn’t: Coordination Failures in Sover- 
eign Debt Restructurings 3–4 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. WP/11/265, 2011) (document- 
ing the effective use of other restructuring techniques). But even when the sovereign uses another 
restructuring technique, its success depends on creditor consent. 
139. See Jeffrey Sachs, Theoretical Issues in International Borrowing 44–45 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 1189, 1983). In brief, bondholders may refuse to participate in a re- 
structuring in the hope of extracting a side payment, benefitting from a government bailout, or recov- 
ering the full value of their debt through litigation. And if enough bondholders choose this path, the 
sovereign will be unable to get the needed debt relief. 
140. Put differently, if a sovereign wants to restructure its debt, its restructuring proposal must be 
accompanied by a credible commitment that holdouts will not receive better terms. Without such a 
commitment, too few bondholders will voluntarily participate in the restructuring. The need to make 
such a commitment explains some otherwise-perplexing sovereign behavior, such as Argentina’s 2005 
enactment of the so-called Padlock Law, which forbade the Argentine government to offer holdouts to 
“any kind of court, out-of-court, or private transaction, or settlement.” See Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, 
To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That Is the Question in Sovereign Bonds After the Lat- 
est Episode of the Argentine Saga, 15 L. & BUS. REV. AMS. 745, 757–58 (2009). 
141. See, e.g., Reynolds Holding, Argentina Hold ‘Em, BREAKINGVIEWS (Apr. 9, 2012), http:// 
www.breakingviews.com/argentina-case-puts-bite-in-holdout-hedgies-bark/21010820.article (describ- 
ing the hedge fund Elliott Associates’ decade-long fight to recover against Argentina, and Argentina’s 
willingness to ignore U.S. court judgments). This does not mean that court judgments impose no costs   
on the issuer. Although creditors have little hope of seizing sovereign assets, judgments impose some- 
thing like an embargo on the sovereign’s commercial relations with third parties. In some  cases, the  
costs of this embargo may induce the sovereign to pay voluntarily. On this dynamic generally, see W. 
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It does not necessarily follow, however, that legal enforcement is ir- 
relevant. Under a regime of absolute immunity, a sovereign that antici- 
pates default need not take steps to protect its assets. But under the 
FSIA, the sovereign may need to shelter assets, and this may prevent it 
from putting them to better use.142 Thus, contract terms that facilitate en- 
forcement may deter default by making it more costly.143 In addition, a 
few specialized investorsmostly hedge funds trading in distressed 
debthave managed to force unwilling sovereigns to satisfy a judg- 
ment.144 If such investors add liquidity to sovereign debt markets, inves- 
tors may value contract terms that facilitate litigation.145 
These possibilities suggest a straightforward, functional explanation 
for the post-FSIA change in bond contracts: perhaps investors believed 
that the threat of litigation could help deter default and that the FSIA 
had finally made litigation feasible, at least when the sovereign had 
waived its immunity from suit.146 This story conforms nicely to the view 
that drafters will swiftly revise contracts to account for material legal de- 
velopments.147 The next sections briefly expand this argument before ex- 
plaining why it cannot adequately explain either the uniformity of the 
contract shift or its specific link to the FSIA. 
 
A. The FSIA’s Limited Practical Impact 
Although sovereign immunity law had been evolving for decades, 
the FSIA did represent a change. Recall that, beyond removing the State 
Department from immunity determinations, the statute (1) made clear 
 
Mark C. Weidemaier and Anna Gelpern, Injunctions in  Sovereign  Debt Litigation at 24–30 (draft dat-   
ed Sept. 25, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330914. 
142. See Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt, 
97 J. POL. ECON. 155 (1989). If contract terms can decrease the cost of default in this manner, it might 
make sense to include them under the “can’t hurt, might help” principle of contract drafting. 
143. Despite this possibility, the evidence suggests that litigation imposes only modest costs. See 
Faisal Z. Ahmed et al., Lawsuits and Empire: On the Enforcement of Sovereign Debt in Latin America, 
73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 39, 46 (2010). 
144. See generally Mark A. Cymrot, Barricades at the IMF: Creating a Municipal Bankruptcy 
Model for Foreign States, 36 INT’L LAW. 1103 (2002) (arguing for a modified municipal bankruptcy 
system that would allow distressed nations to seek remedies similar to those currently employed by 
businesses); G. Mitu Gulati & Kenneth N. Klee, Sovereign Piracy, 56 BUS. LAW. 635 (2001) (discussing 
the impact of the Brussels court’s interpretation of the pari passu clauses and the need for this inter- 
pretation to be challenged). These efforts continue with  ongoing efforts by  NML Capital, a  subsidiary 
of hedge fund Elliott Associates, to recover on defaulted Argentine debt.  See  Transcript of Proceed-  
ings at 11:30 AM at 4, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Arg., 08-CV-6978 (TPG) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 
2011). 
145. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The Role of Litigation in 
Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1100–01 (2004). 
146. To explain the corresponding shift in bonds governed by English law or listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, of course, one would also have to attribute similar importance to the State Immunity 
Act. 
147. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
396, 397 (2009) (noting insight, underlying economic theory, that parties will choose terms that maxim- 
ize their joint surplus); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 554 (2003). See also ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW 
AND THEORY vii (4th ed. 2007) (noting that lawyers draft  contracts  to  avoid  problems  revealed  
through past disputes). 
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that a waiver of immunity from suit could not be revoked, (2) let credi- 
tors execute judgments against a limited range of sovereign property, and 
(3) allowed execution against a wider range of assets when a sovereign 
had separately waived immunity from execution.148 I have argued that 
the first two of these changes, and possibly all three, were relatively 
modest when compared to the pre-FSIA law as it had evolved after the 
Tate Letter.149 But perhaps investors were clamoring even for modest 
improvements in enforcement rights and believed that the FSIA had fi- 
nally made litigation a viable option. 
Imagine, for example, that between 1950 and 1975 it gradually be- 
came easier to sue a foreign state but that investors still judged litigation 
to be hopeless. Imagine further that the benefits conferred by the FSIA, 
however modest, were just enough to make litigation feasible, so that is- 
suers could lower borrowing costs by agreeing to be sued. This is a famil- 
iar dynamic in lending relationships. Lenders act on incomplete infor- 
mation about the borrower’s ability and intent to repay and price this 
risk into their loans.150 If a borrower can credibly commit to repay- 
mentas by agreeing to suffer a penalty in the event of defaultit can 
reduce its borrowing costs.151 In this story, the FSIA acted as a trigger: 
before the statute, litigation had zero value; afterwards, it had non-zero 
value, and nearly all issuers chose to take advantage of the pricing bene- 
fits offered by sovereign immunity waivers. Note that, for this story to 
make sense, issuers must be able to make a credible commitment to re- 
payment simply by agreeing to waive immunity from suit.152 
The next section attempts to assess the pricing implications of the 
FSIA’s enactment.153 Before doing so, however, I note two problems 
with this account. First, the data undercut the view that contract terms 
waiving immunity from suit functioned as a commitment device. The 
reason is simple: if they served this function, why were such waivers not 
included in pre-FSIA bond contracts? As I have explained, beginning in 
 
148. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1), 1605(a)(2), 1610(a)(1) (2012). The statute also established pro- 
cedures for serving process. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (2012). This was no trivial matter before 
the FSIA, but neither was it an insurmountable hurdle.   The classic method of securing jurisdiction     
was to attach sovereign assets, but courts gradually began to permit service of process as a less intru-  
sive method. For a contemporary summary of post-Tate Letter law and State Department policy, see 
generally Murray J. Belman et al., New Departures in the Law of Sovereign Immunity, in 63 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L LAW, Perspectives for  International  Legal  Development 
(Apr. 24–26, 1969). 
149. See supra Part II.A.3. 
150. See, e.g., Michael K. Ulan, Should Developing Countries Restrict Capital Inflows?, 579 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 249, 250 (2002). 
151. See Adam Feibelman, Equitable Subordination, Fraudulent Transfer, and Sovereign Debt, 70 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 171, 187 n.95 (2007); Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer 
Credit  Regulation, 44  EMORY L.J. 587, 598–602 (1995) (discussing  penalties and their intended  impact  
on debtor behavior). For an analogous argument in  the  context  of  bilateral  investment  treaties,  see  
Zachary Elkins et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 265, 278. 
152. Recall from Figure 1 that bonds did not incorporate waivers of immunity from execution for 
another fifteen years. 
153. See infra Part III.B. 
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the 1950s it grew increasingly likely that the State Department or the 
courts would enforce the waiver.154 The odds may not have been high, 
but they were not zero. Moreover, even if such a waiver would have 
been revocable under pre-FSIA law, an issuer who invoked that right 
might cause a range of third parties to view it as an unreliable partner.155 
In other words, if waivers of immunity functioned as a commitment de- 
vice, issuers arguably would have provided them well before the FSIA. 
Yet only one country in the dataset did so.156 
Nor could the FSIA’s provisions regarding immunity from execution 
transform post-FSIA contracts (which waived only immunity from suit) 
into credible commitment devices.157 It is true that, before the statute, 
sovereign assets were absolutely immune from execution.158 As a  practi- 
cal matter, however, the statute did little to change this for post-FSIA 
bonds.159 Holders of these bonds could enforce a court judgment only if 
they could find assets that were “used for the commercial activity” upon 
which they had based their claims.160 As a practical matter, this would  
likely prove impossible, for none of the issuer’s assets (assuming it had 
any in the United States) would have been “used for”  obtaining  the  
loan.161 From an enforcement perspective, then, holders of  post-FSIA 
bonds were no better off than holders of pre-FSIA bonds.162 
The second reason for skepticism has to do with the uniformity of 
post-FSIA contracts. Even if a waiver of immunity from suit could func- 
tion as a commitment device, it is odd that nearly every issuer agreed to 
provide one. Sovereign bonds are often described as “boilerplate.”163 
The term is apt but also obscures the fact that contracts vary in important 
 
154. See supra text accompanying notes 73–75. 
155. Cf. Elkins et al., supra note 151 (noting, in the context of bilateral investment treaties, that 
“when a government spurns the decision of a neutral authoritative third party with which it has volun- 
tarily precommitted to comply, a range of  important actorspublic and  privateare  likely to  infer  
that that government is an unreliable economic partner”); Weidemaier, supra note 4, at 345 & nn.49–  
50. 
156. See supra text accompanying notes 122–23. 
157. The argument here would be that, after the FSIA, an investor who managed to parlay the 
sovereign’s waiver of immunity from suit into a judgment for money damages finally had some hope of 
enforcing the award even without a waiver of immunity from execution. But this is wishful thinking. 
As the text indicates, the investor would find it nearly impossible to find non-immune assets to seize. 
158. See supra text accompanying notes 26–29. 
159. See supra text accompanying notes 77–78. 
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1)–(2). Some assets remain immune from execution, such as assets held  
by a central bank “for its own account.” 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1). 
161. See supra text accompanying notes 77–78. 
162. As noted earlier, see supra note 130, it would in theory have been possible to enforce a U.S. 
court judgment in another jurisdiction. Likewise, a creditor might have been able to seize the  proceeds  
of a new loan in the United States, although this would be a long shot. 
163. See Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Mandate and Market: Contract Transition in the Shadow of 
the International Order, 53 EMORY L.J. 691, 714, 718–20 (2004); Karen Halverson Cross, Arbitration as 
a Means of Resolving Sovereign Debt Disputes, 17 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 335, 337 (2006); Anna Gelp- 
ern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1627, 1629 
(2006). See also Choi & Gulati, supra note 124, at 932 n.7 (discussing assumption of standardization in 
sovereign bond contracts); Michael Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International 
Arbitration, 101 AM. J. INT’L L. 711, 732 n.131 (2007); Weidemaier, supra note 120, at 8–14 (discussing 
theoretical implications of characterizing sovereign bond contracts as boilerplate). 
No. 1] SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND SOVEREIGN DEBT 93 
 
ways.164 And historically, contracting practices were not uniform, espe- 
cially when it comes to terms that sovereign borrowers find offensive, 
such as sovereign immunity waivers. 
Long before the FSIA, lenders were attuned to the potential bene- 
fits of dispute resolution terms and sometimes included them in govern- 
ment loan contractsjust not in bonds issued by sovereign countries.165 
By the mid-1940s, for example, such clauses occasionally appeared in 
contracts for direct loans by banks to foreign countries.166 In addition, by 
the 1950s, such clauses sometimes appeared in bonds issued in foreign 
markets by quasi-sovereign entities, such as cities and provinces.167 Even 
in these contexts, however, contracts did not uniformly include dispute 
resolution terms.168 Thus, when lawyers began to draft immunity waivers 
for bonds issued by sovereign countries, there was no clearly established 
market preference for uniformity. 
Sovereign countries, moreover, do not like to be sued in foreign 
courts. If absolutely necessary, a country might waive its immunity in 
order to obtain a direct loan from a commercial bank or bank syndi- 
cate.169 Such contracts are often kept private, and in any event they can 
be invoked only by the relative handful of parties to the loan. By con- 
trast, bonds are public documents, and, in most cases, hundreds or thou- 
sands of bondholders can invoke their dispute resolution provisions.170 
 
164. Cf. Choi & Gulati, supra note 124, at 932 n.7 (noting that the assumption of standardized 
terms is “routinely made” in research about sovereign debt contracts, but noting that at least one study 
has challenged this assumption in the collective action clause context); Weidemaier, supra note 120, at 
24–38 (illustrating variance in “boilerplate” dispute resolution terms in sovereign bonds). 
165. This is not to say that international courts and tribunals never heard claims arising out of 
sovereign default. See generally MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS (2011). Such claims arise in a variety of ways, including by executive agree- 
ment. See Wuerth, supra note 42, at 26–27 & n.176 (summarizing history of U.S. executive agreements 
with respect to arbitration commissions). 
166. GEORGES R. DELAUME, LEGAL ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL LENDING AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT FINANCING 161–87 (1967); see also Philip R. Wood, Essay: Sovereign Syndicated Bank 
Credits in the 1970s, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 12–15 (2010) (noting that borrowers agreed to 
various dispute resolution terms in syndicated loans in the 1970s). 
167. For example, bonds issued in the late 1950s and 1960s by Oslo, Milan, Copenhagen, Helsinki, 
and Tokyo appoint an agent to receive service of process and waive immunity from suit before courts 
in New York or London. The status of such entities was uncertain, but some courts held that they 
were entitled to assert sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503, 
504–05 (E.D.N.Y. 1941). On the uncertainty generally, see DELAUME, supra note 166, at 157–60. See 
also Coyle, supra note 48 (discussing immunity of state-owned enterprises). 
168. For example, disclosure documents for bonds issued in the 1950s and 1960s by Buenos Aires, 
Hamburg, and Rio Grande do Sul (all on file with author) do not report the existence of any dispute 
resolution provisions. In compiling the dataset, we were primarily interested in bonds issued by sover- 
eign countries. Thus, we made no concerted effort to gather bonds issued by cities and provinces, alt- 
hough we often included those bonds when we came across them. As a result, I list these examples 
only to show the lack of uniformity with respect to sovereign immunity waivers and other terms relat- 
ed to dispute resolution. I make no claims regarding the relative prevalence of such clauses in bonds 
issued by quasi-sovereign entities. 
169. See Wood, supra note 166, at 14–15. 
170. See, e.g., MERRILL LYNCH INTERNATIONAL, U.S. $22,000,000,000 THE LEBANESE REPUBLIC 
GLOBAL MEDIUM-TERM NOTE PROGRAM 104 (2009) (“The Republic irrevocably agrees for the bene- 
fit of each Holder of Notes that the courts of the State of New York and of the United States sitting in 
the City of New York, Borough of Manhattan, shall have non-exclusive jurisdiction . . . .”). Other con- 
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There is a big difference between agreeing to be sued by a handful of in- 
ternational banks and agreeing to be sued by anyone who happens to ac- 
quire a sovereign bond. As a result, many issuers resist including a waiv- 
er of immunity in a bond contract.171 For their part, lenders should bar- 
bargain more fiercely to obtain a waiver in some contexts, such as when 
the issuer presents a higher risk of default.172 For example, issuers with 
no reputational “bond”173 to post, such as new market entrants, might 
waive immunity from suit, while issuers who returned to the bond mar- 
kets frequently and enjoyed sterling reputations for repayment might 
not.174 
Such a pattern would be consistent with corporate lending practic- 
es.175 It would also be consistent with historic practices in the sovereign 
debt markets. Before World War II, for example, countries with solid 
reputations for repayment often issued bonds without providing inves- 
tors any special protection against default. Issuers with less sterling repu- 
tations sometimes did the same if they found a prestigious banking house 
to underwrite the bonds.176 Higher-risk issuers, however, often agreed to 
onerous terms that caused some insult to their sovereignty. For example, 
an issuer might have to place some of its assets or revenues under the 
control of an agent appointed by the lenders.177 Such secured, or “ear- 
 
 
tractual mechanisms, of course, may prevent individual bondholders from filing suit, such as when that 
power is assigned to a trustee. 
171. Lee Buchheit suggests that borrowers render their opposition to a waiver of immunity “truly 
memorable for the bankers [by having] other members of the country negotiating team softly hum the 
Marseillaise in the background.” LEE C. BUCHHEIT, HOW TO NEGOTIATE EUROCURRENCY LOAN 
AGREEMENTS 142 (2d ed. 2000). 
172. Analogously, lenders to corporate borrowers may bargain for more constraints on manageri-    
al discretion when repayment is less assured. See infra note 175. 
173. See generally David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 373, 414–17 (1990). 
174. Cf. Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 671–74 
(1997) (positing that public companies have significant reputational capital to preserve and that this 
reduces the benefits to creditors of secured lending). The question how reputational constraints affect 
government decision-making is a complicated one.  For a discussion, see generally Brewster, supra   
note 29 (exploring the limits of reputation as a source of compliance with international law). 
175. Lenders may confer significant discretion on corporate managers in the hope of seeing high 
returns, but they also will incur risk.  Contract terms that limit managers’ discretion can mitigate this   
risk but also may result in lower returns. See Michael Bradley & G. Mitu Gulati, Collective Action 
Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis 46 (Mar. 28, 2013) (working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948534.   Generally,  higher-risk  borrowers  agree 
to more restrictions on managerial discretion. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael R. Roberts, The 
Structure and Pricing of Corporate Debt Covenants 5 (May 13, 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=466240. 
176. For underwriting banks, the decision whether to “stand sponsor” for an issuer, or to risk hav- 
ing another bank capture the underwriting business, could be difficult. For example, cables in the JP 
Morgan archives reveal internal debate over whether the bank should participate in a 1914 loan to 
Argentina being arranged by the less-prestigious National City Bank: “Of course we can only too easi-   
ly secure interest in business, but would be entirely unwilling [to] lead in it and stand sponsor for these 
notes with the public.” Telegram from J.P. Morgan & Co. to H.P. Davidson, Esq., (Dec. 21, 1914) (on 
file with author). 
177. See, e.g., Chinese Government Five Per Cent Reorganization Gold Loan Agreement, 2, Apr. 
26, 1913 (providing that bonds would be “secured . . . by a charge” on revenues from the salt trade and 
on customs revenues). 
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marked,” loans were common in the pre-World War II era, but they were 
generally reserved for higher-risk borrowers.178 
As a matter of theory, it makes sense that one would see such vari- 
ance.179 A contract term (such as an “earmark”) adds value by increasing 
the likelihood that the borrower will repay the loan.180 The value added, 
however, varies inversely with the issuer’s reputation for repaymentfor 
issuers who are already likely to repay do not need much additional in- 
centive.181 At the same time, most issuers find the proposed term offen- 
sive and would prefer not to agree to it.182 So, predictably, the term ap- 
pears in loans where it has real value to add: those made to countries 
perceived to be at higher risk of default. 
Yet practices with respect to dispute resolution do not fit this mod- 
el. Consider first waivers of immunity from jurisdiction. From 1952 on, 
it was increasingly likely that the State Department or the courts would 
decline to confer immunity on a sovereign that had waived this immunity 
in a contract.183 In that context, one might expect a few issuers to provide 
such a waiver, especially those who were perceived to present a higher 
risk of default. Yet except for one issuance, by Malaysia in 1965, the da- 
taset includes no case when a sovereign country waived its immunity 
from suit in foreign courts in the twenty years following the Tate Letter. 
Then, between the FSIA’s introduction in Congress in 1973 and its en- 
actment in 1976, a few additional countries included immunity waivers in 
their bonds.184 But these were countries like Norway and Finland that 
presumably did not need to provide a waiver to borrow on acceptable 
terms.185 And finally, after the FSIA’s enactment, virtually every issu- 
erno matter how highly ratedwaived immunity from suit.186 
 
 
178. For some examples, see generally HERBERT FEIS, EUROPE: THE WORLD’S BANKER, 1870– 
1914 (1930). For evidence on the prevalence of these “earmarking” arrangements, see generally 
Weidemaier, supra note 118. 
179. Observers familiar with sovereign bond contracts may object that contract change tends to 
occur in clusters. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Political Risk and Sovereign Debt Contracts 18, (John M. 
Olin Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 583, 2d. ser., 2011). As a general matter that is true, at least in 
the modern era. As discussed in the text, however, it is less obviously true with respect to terms that 
issuers view with hostility, such as terms providing “security” for the loan and terms subjecting the 
issuer to suit in foreign courts. For that reason, the “clustered” nature of the post-FSIA shift is some- 
what unusual. 
180. With respect to earmarks, for example, powerful governments may have been more willing     
to intervene diplomatically on behalf of lenders whose contracts contained a specific pledge of reve-  
nues or assets. See 1  EDWIN  BORCHARD,  STATE  INSOLVENCY  AND  FOREIGN  BONDHOLDERS  98 
(1951). 
181. See Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 6, at 43 & n.2 (1989) (citing an “influential body of research 
hold[ing] that a small country can enjoy at least some access to world capital markets by maintaining a 
reputation for repaying its loans”). 
182. Cf. BUCHHEIT, supra note 171, at 134–44 (discussing sovereign objections to submission to 
jurisdiction clauses and waivers of immunity). 
183. See supra text accompanying notes 67–75. 
184. See Figure 1. 
185. Both of these countries were rated AAA by Standard & Poor’s. See STANDARD & POOR’S 
STOCK AND BOND GUIDE 144–45 (1993). 
186. See Figure 1. 
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In sum, the uniform nature of the shift is hard to square with the 
FSIA’s relatively modest technical properties, with historic variance in 
how government loans employed immunity waivers, and with the historic 
reluctance of countries to agree to contract terms that offend their sover- 
eignty. Moreover, as the next section demonstrates, there is little evi- 
dence that bond investors thought the FSIA provided any real enforce- 
ment benefits. 
 
B. The Investor Reaction: A Collective Yawn 
If changes to sovereign immunity law, sovereign bonds, or both 
lowered the risk of default, one would expect this to be reflected in in- 
creased bond prices.187 Unfortunately, a number of factors make it diffi- 
cult to assess the market reaction. Because virtually all issuers waived 
immunity from suit after the FSIA, one cannot exploit variance in the 
terms of different countries’ bonds.188 Nor can one easily compare the 
same issuer’s pre- and post-FSIA bonds.189 This is because the sovereign 
bond markets were relatively dormant from the 1930s to the late 1980s,190 
and relatively few issuers had pre- and post-FSIA bonds trading at 
roughly the same time.191 Finally, the yield spread on sovereign bonds is 
perhaps the ideal measure of perceived risk,192 but U.S. Treasury yields 
were extremely volatile in late 1976 and early 1977,193 making it difficult 
to calculate spreads for the period of most direct interest. Despite all of 
these caveats, however, there is no evidence of any market reaction at all. 
 
 
187. Cf. William W. Bratton, Jr., Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of Re- 
structuring, 1989 DUKE L.J. 92, 110; Frank J. Fabozzi, Bonds: Investment Features and Risks, in 
HANDBOOK OF FINANCE VOLUME 1: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS 207, 218  (Frank  J. 
Fabozzi ed., 2008) (explaining the relationship between perceived default risk and bond prices). 
188. In the modern era, there is variance in the use of waivers of immunity from execution, but no 
evidence that this variance is priced. Cf. infra note 272. 
189. For example, assume that bonds issued by the same country pre- and post-FSIA were traded 
at the same time on secondary markets. After accounting for differences in maturity and other con- 
tract terms, any difference in yield might be attributed to the bonds’ differing approaches to sovereign 
immunity. In particular, lower yields on the post-FSIA bonds might indicate that investors associated 
a waiver of immunity from suit with lower default risk. Unfortunately, there are few opportunities to 
make such a comparison. See infra text accompanying note 216. 
190. See Marc Flandreau et al., The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sover- 
eign Bond Markets, 1815-2007, at 20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 15128), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w15128 (noting that “between the collapse of the 1930s and  
the securitization of the 1980s (Brady bonds), there were about 50 years during which the international 
government debt market was a sleeping beauty”). 
191. Once issued, bonds were rarely traded on secondary markets. For some bonds, months 
passed without a trade. When there were trades, moreover, the volumes were extremely low. On 
same days, the Wall Street Journal might report sovereign bond trading volume of as little as $1000. 
192. Yield spreads capture the difference in yield between a  security and an equivalent but risk-  
free security—typically a U.S. treasury bond of equivalent maturity—and thus allow for assessments of 
relative risk. See Frank J. Fabozzi & George P. Kegler, Federal Agency Securities, in HANDBOOK OF 
FINANCE VOLUME 1: FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS 243, 248 (Frank J. Fabozzi, ed., 2008); 
Mark Hallerberg & Guntram B. Wolff, Fiscal Institutions, Fiscal Policy and Sovereign Risk Premia in 
EMU, 136 PUB. CHOICE 379, 382–83 (2008). 
193. See Timothy Q. Cook, Changing Yield Spreads in the U.S. Government Bond Market: Flower 
Bonds Bloom, Then Wilt, FED. RES. BANK OF RICHMOND ECON. REV., Mar.–Apr. 1977, at 3. 
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Begin by considering the FSIA’s impact on outstanding bondsi.e., 
those issued (without an immunity waiver) before the statute. Figures 2– 
3 track the prices of some of the more frequently-traded bonds in two 
windows around the FSIA’s introduction and passage.194 Prices were 
gathered from the Wall Street Journal daily edition during the relevant 
periods. Figure 2 focuses on an eight month window around January 22, 
1973, when the State Department and Department of Justice jointly 
submitted the FSIA as proposed legislation to the President of the Sen- 
ate.195 
Because the proposed statute had such broad support, investors 
might have thought that passage was assured.196 On the other hand, the 
draft differed in some respects from the final version of the statute in 
ways that were less favorable to bondholders. Like the final version, the 
proposed legislation made clear that courts, rather than the State 
Department, would be responsible for immunity determinations.197 The 
draft also provided that judgments could be enforced against sovereign 
assets only if there was a nexus between the assets and the commercial 
activity underlying the suit; this requirement also appeared in the final 
bill.198 The draft statute differed, however, in providing that the sover- 
eign would remain immune from suit in cases arising out of its “public 
debt,” unless it had explicitly waived this immunity.199 Still, the proposed 
statute had a high chance of passage and clearly signaled a liberalization 
in the law of foreign sovereign immunity. Yet the statute’s introduction 















194. Even these bonds were not traded every day. Some were traded on fewer than a dozen days 
in the period. 
195. Draft Legislation on Jurisdicitonal Immunities, supra note 62, at 118 (stating that the FSIA 
draft bill was jointly submitted by the Department of State and Department of Justice). 
196. See supra note 26. 
197. Draft Legislation on Jurisdicitonal Immunities, supra note 62, at 124. 
198. Id. at 128. According to the draft, assets “used for a particular commercial activity in the 
United States” were not immune from execution if “such attachment or execution relates to a claim 
which is based on that commercial activity . . . .” The statute also would have allowed execution on a 
wider range of assets, but only if the contract contained a waiver of execution. 
199. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 85–89 (discussing what was considered in deter- 
mining public debt immunity). 
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FIGURE 2: PRICES (USD) OF FREQUENTLY-TRADED BONDS; 8- 




















Figure 3 reports prices in a six month window around October 21, 
1976, the FSIA’s date of enactment.200 As enacted, the statute did not 
explicitly address “public debt” cases, leaving it to the courts to deter- 
mine whether the issuance of bonds was a commercial act.201 The ques- 
tion would not be settled until 1992,202 but bondholders had reason to be 
confident of the outcome given the statute’s legislative history and the 
fact that the exception for “public debt” cases had been removed.203 
Moreover, the statute made clear, as had the early drafts, that courts 
were to treat waivers of immunity as irrevocable.204 Once again, howev- 
er, bond prices reveal no evidence that investors viewed this as a material 














200. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891. 
201. If it was, the sovereign would lose its immunity from suit. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
202. See Arg. v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). 
203. As noted earlier, the House Judiciary Committee had removed the provisions addressing 
“public debt” cases on the ground that these cases “should be treated like other similar commercial 
transactions.” See supra text accompanying note 88; see also H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 10 (1976). 
204. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(1) with Draft Legislation on Jurisdicitonal Immunities, supra 











Mexico 8.5% 1987 
Italy 3% 1977 
Mexico 7.25% 1981 
Mexico 6.75% 1978 
Mexico 6.5% 1980 
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Norway 8.9% 1980 
Brazil 10% 1981 
Australia 8.75% 1983 
Mexico 10% 1980 
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Yield spreads might be a better measure of the market’s response to 
these events.205 As noted previously, however, treasury yields were espe- 
cially volatile in late 1976 and early 1977, introducing variance that can- 
not be attributed to the perceived risk associated with the foreign issuer’s 
bonds.206 The problem is compounded by the infrequency with which 
bonds were traded.207 Figure 4 nevertheless depicts the average yield 
spread for the bonds issued by one country, Mexico, for the period No- 
vember 1972 through 1977.208 Note that several of these bonds were not 
traded at all during this period. For those bonds, yield spread was com- 
puted from the month-end yields reported in Standard & Poor’s Bond 











205. See supra note 192. 
206. See supra text accompanying note 193. 
207. See supra text accompanying note 191. 
208. The bonds are Mexico’s: (1) 6.5% bonds issued in 1964 and maturing in 1979; (2) 6.25% 
bonds issued in 1964 and maturing in 1979; (3) 6.5% bonds issued in 1965 and maturing in 1980; (4) 
6.875% bonds issued in 1966 and maturing in 1981; (5) 7.25% bonds issued in 1966 and maturing in 
1981; and (6) 7% bonds issued in 1967 and maturing in 1982. 
209. A bid price is “[t]he highest price a market maker will pay to buy a specific  number of  
shares.” Bid Price, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://investor.gov/glossary/ 
glossary_terms/bid-price (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
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FIGURE 4: AVERAGE YIELD SPREAD FOR MEXICAN BONDS 






















If the FSIA had materially reduced the perceived risk of default, 
one would expect spreads to have gone down as a result of the statute’s 
introduction or passage.210 But this does not seem to have happened. To 
the contrary, and despite some volatility, spreads remained generally 
higher than they had been in late 1972, two months before the statute 
was introduced, and also higher than they had been in the months before 
the statute’s October 1976 enactment. Given the limits of the data, and 
the range of factors that might influence bond yields, this is hardly dis- 
positive. But there is no reason to believe that investors associated the 
FSIA with a reduction in default risk. 
Figures 2–4 focus on bonds issued before the FSIA. Unlike post- 
FSIA bonds, these did not include waivers of immunity from suit.211 The 
figures thus provide no direct evidence as to how investors viewed bonds 
issued after the statute. As explained in the previous section, however, 
investors had little reason to favor post-FSIA bonds.212 The only real dif- 
ference was that holders of new bonds could invoke the jurisdiction of 
U.S. courts without establishing that the issuance of bonds was a com- 
mercial act.213 But since holders of old bonds might have been able to in- 
voke the jurisdiction of U.S. courts tooand since, in any event, no 
bondholder had a meaningful right to enforce a judgmentthe differ- 
ence was modest at best.214 
 
 
210. Cf. Fabozzi, supra note 187, at 218 (explaining that because U.S. government securities are 
considered to be free of default risk, “a non-U.S. government taxable bond will trade in the market at 
a higher yield than a U.S. government taxable bond that is otherwise comparable in terms of maturity 
and coupon rate”). 
211. See Figure 1. 
212. See Part III.A. 
213. Before the FSIA, the State Department bore primary responsibility for making immunity 
determinations. See Part II.A.3. After the FSIA, holders of bonds that did not include a waiver of 
immunity from suit could bypass the State Department but would have needed to convince a court 
that the issuance of bonds was a commercial act. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
214. After the FSIA, a bondholder who had not obtained a waiver of the sovereign’s  immunity  
from execution could enforce a judgment only against commercial assets that had the requisite nexus      
to the loan. See supra text accompanying notes 158–62. 
FSIA enacted 
FSIA introduced 
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Readers inclined to assign more significance to waivers of immunity 
from suit might prefer a more robust test of the market response to post- 
FSIA bonds. As noted previously, the uniformity of the shift, combined 
with the fact that few countries had both pre- and post-FSIA bonds trad- 
ing in the late 1970s, makes such a test difficult.215 In two cases, however, 
the dataset includes bonds issued by the same country both with and 
without a waiver of immunity from suit (Norway and Finland).216 In this 
very small subset of bonds, there were no noticeable differences in yield 
spread between bonds that included waivers of immunity from suit and 
those that did not.217 In short, investors seemingly greeted the FSIA it- 
self, and the new contracts that were issued in the statute’s wake, with a 
collective shrug. Certainly nothing indicates a newfound interest in legal 
enforcement. 
 
IV. ON THE LIMITS OF DOCTRINE AND THE PRODUCTION OF 
BOILERPLATE CONTRACTS 
Beyond a doubt, the middle of the twentieth century witnessed ma- 
jor developments in the law of foreign sovereign immunity.218 Most no- 
tably, the United States and the United Kingdom, two major jurisdictions 
in which enforcement litigation might take place, finally abandoned the 
doctrine of absolute immunity.219 As they occurred, these doctrinal 
changes captured the attention of lawyers, policy makers, and the me- 
dia.220 By opening the door to litigation against foreign states and offi- 
cials,221 the Tate Letter and FSIA spawned a host of difficult questions 
that continue to occupy public officials and scholars today.222 Part III 
demonstrated, however, that this doctrinal revolution had little practical 
significance in the bond markets. That conclusion is important, first and 
 
215. Any difference between the same country’s pre- and post-FSIA bonds might reasonably be 
attributed to the waiver of immunity from suit contained in the latter. See supra note 189 and accom- 
panying text. 
216. For Norway, these include: (1) 5.5% bond issued in 1962 and maturing in 1977 (no waiver); 
(2) 5.25% bonds issued in 1963 and maturing in 1978 (no waiver); (3) 8.875% bonds issued in 1976 and 
maturing in 1980 (waiver); (4) 8.85% bonds issued in 1976 and maturing in 1980 (waiver); and (5)  
8.25% bonds issued in 1976 and maturing in 1981 (waiver). For Finland, these include (1) 6% bonds 
issued in 1964 and maturing in 1979 (no waiver); (2) 6.5% bonds issued in 1965 and maturing in 1980 
(no waiver); and (3) 7.875% bonds issued in 1977 and maturing in 1981 (waiver). 
217. In some months, in fact, spreads were higher for post-FSIA bonds than for pre-FSIA bonds, 
although this may be due to volatility in the treasury market. 
218. See, e.g., STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 2, at 56. 
219. As noted earlier, other jurisdictions had abandoned the doctrine of absolute immunity much 
earlier. See supra note 26. 
220. See, e.g., The Committee on International Law, Proposed Federal Legislation on Immunity of 
Foreign States in Proceedings Before American Courts (H.R. 3493; S.566), 30 REC. ASS'N B. CITY NEW 
YORK 301 (1975); Proposed Legislation on Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States: A Report of the 
International and Foreign Law Committee of The Chicago Bar Association, 56 CHICAGO B. REC. 78 
(1974); Richard I. Fine, Sovereign Immunity and the Nation State Cartel, LOS ANGELES B. J., Dec.  
1975, at 283, 287–92; Eric Pace, Exotic Old Foreign Bonds Focus of Collection Suits: Holders of Some 
Old Foreign Bonds Sue for Payment, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1983, at B4. 
221. See Foster, supra note 134, at 667 (noting that more than 200 reported court cases had been 
filed against foreign sovereigns in the United States between 2004 and the time of the writing). 
222. See generally Wuerth, supra note 52. 
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foremost, as a reminder that major legal developments need not have a 
potentor indeed, anyimpact on the ground. 
Sovereign lending, of course, was not the primary driver of changes 
in sovereign immunity law.223 At the time of the Tate Letter, policy mak- 
ers were more immediately concerned with the fact that foreign govern- 
ments were increasingly engaged in activity that was commercial rather 
than “governmental” in nature.224 The Tate Letter noted this “wide- 
spread and increasing practice” and cited it as a primary justification for 
opening U.S. courts to suits against foreign sovereigns.225 On a more 
pragmatic level, I have also argued that changes to sovereign immunity 
law were part of a broader effort to insulate U.S. political actors from 
pressure to intervene on behalf of citizens whose foreign investments had 
soured.226 That kind of pressure could arise in a wide range of investment 
contexts and transactions; it was not confined to sovereign lending.227 
Perhaps changes to sovereign immunity law were more meaningful in 
other kinds of disputes.228 
All of this is true, but it is equally true that the FSIA was enacted 
following years of debate over whether to grant U.S. courts jurisdiction 
over sovereign lending disputes.229 The argument for preserving the sov- 
ereign’s traditional immunity from suit was that a contrary rule would 
prompt foreign governments to avoid issuing bonds in U.S. capital mar- 
kets out of fear of being sued.230 The rebuttal, most forcefully articulated 
by Georges Delaume, was that foreign governments had already demon- 
strated their willingness to waive that immunity in certain kinds of loan 
contracts, such as when they borrowed money directly from U.S. banks231 
and when they issued bonds in some European capital markets.232 It is 
worth pausing to note the disconnect between these arguments and the 
apparent disinterest with which investors viewed the question. Legal dis- 
course often takes for granted that the choice of legal rules matters. But 
at times, the choice may matter only to lawyers, academics, and others 
for whom legal rules are the stock-in-trade. This seems to have been true 
 
 
223. See generally Tate Letter, supra note 53, at 984–85 (discussing developments underlying shift 
to restrictive theory of sovereign immunity); Delaume, supra note 86 (discussing purposes of FSIA). 
224. In particular, the Soviet Union and its socialist allies routinely carried out business through 
state-sponsored commercial entities. See STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTER- 
NATIONAL LAW 191–92 (2006). 
225. See Tate Letter, supra note 53, at 969, 984–85. 
226. See supra Part II.A.4. 
227. As an extreme example, the U.S. corporation United Fruit sought to involve the U.S. gov- 
ernment in protecting the company’s investments in Guatemala by harnessing fears of a communist 
takeover in that country. See STEPHEN SCHLESINGER & STEPHEN KINZER, BITTER FRUIT: THE 
STORY OF THE AMERICAN COUP IN GUATEMALA 79–97 (2d ed. 2005). 
228. It is also possible that, over time, investors came to assign more value to legal enforcement in 
the sovereign lending context. On that point, however, the evidence is mixed at best. See supra Part 
IV.A. 
229. See supra Part II.A.4. 
230. See Draft Legislation on Jurisdicitonal Immunities, supra note 62, at 143–44. 
231. On these direct loan contracts, see supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
232. See Delaume, supra note 86, at 752. 
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for the great mid-century “tectonic shift”233 in sovereign immunity law, at 
least in the bond markets. 
In sum, the FSIA may have prompted sovereign bond contracts to 
change, but the mid-century revolution in sovereign immunity doctrine 
provided no obvious benefit to investors.234 This conclusion has im- 
portant implications for two debates. The first concerns the role of legal 
enforcement in the sovereign debt markets. The second concerns our 
understanding of the forces that produce change in boilerplate contracts. 
 
A. Enforcement Versus Reputation in the Sovereign Debt Markets 
The difficulty of forcing governments to pay their debts gives rise to 
a puzzle that occupies much of the sovereign debt literature: How can 
sovereigns borrow at all?235 Why lend when you cannot make the bor- 
rower repay?236 Broadly speaking, answers to this question either invoke 
reputational considerations (e.g., sovereigns repay so that they can bor- 
row at acceptable rates in the future)237 or presume that lenders can im- 
pose direct sanctions on a borrower after it defaults.238 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, military coercion 
was a potential sanction for default.239 Influential lenders might pressure 
their government to use military force to compel a weaker country to re- 
pay its debts.240 Although there is debate over the significance of military 
force as an enforcement tool,241 a body of econometric evidence suggests 
that bondholders assigned real value to direct government intervention 
and control. In separate studies, for example, Mitchener and Wei- 
 
 
233. Harold Hongju Koh, Foreign Official Immunity After Samantar: A United States Government 
Perspective, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1141, 1143 (2011); STEPHEN C. MCCAFFREY, 
UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 191–92 (2006). 
234. Although I have been focused primarily on the FSIA, this conclusion extends to the Tate 
Letter as well. Although of unquestioned doctrinal significance, see supra note 52, the Tate Letter 
seemingly failed to impress bond investors. Again using the daily edition of the Wall Street Journal, I 
coded bond prices in an eight-month window around the Tate Letter in 1952 and found no movement 
(or slightly downward movement) during this period. 
235. For a summary, see STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 2, at 31–38. 
236. For a classic treatment of the subject, see Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt With Po- 
tential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289 (1981). 
237. For various reputational models, see generally MICHAEL TOMZ, REPUTATION AND 
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: SOVEREIGN DEBT ACROSS THREE CENTURIES (2007).  See  also  Har- 
old L. Cole & Patrick J. Kehoe, The Role of Institutions in Reputation Models of Sovereign Debt, 35 J. 
MONETARY ECON. 45, 46–48 (1995); Eaton & Gersovitz, supra note 236, at 289–90; Kenneth M. Klet- 
zer & Brian D. Wright, Sovereign Debt as Intertemporal Barter, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 621, 622–23 
(2000). 
238. See Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 142, at 158–59. 
239. See generally Kris James Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, Supersanctions and Sovereign 
Debt Repayment (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11472, 2005). 
240. See id. at 5. 
241. For a skeptical view, see TOMZ, supra note 237, at 114–53 (finding little evidence of a sys- 
tematic link between gunboat diplomacy and bond lending). But see Adam Tooze & Martin Ivanov, 
Disciplining the ‘Black Sheep of the Balkans’: Financial Supervision and Sovereignty in Bulgaria, 1902– 
38, 64 ECON. HIST. REV. 30, 32 & n.11 (2011) (suggesting that coercive discipline played a more signif- 
icant role). 
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denmier242 find that actual or credibly-threatened intervention by power- 
ful states resulted in increased bond prices243 and reduced ex ante default 
probabilities244 for bonds issued in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.245 
Military coercion, of course, is no longer an available sanction.246 
For pure reputational models of sovereign debt, this is unimportant. 
Under these models, borrowers repay so that they can return to capital 
markets on acceptable terms.247 Models that rely on the ability of lenders 
to impose sanctions, however, must identify other ways in which lenders 
can penalize default.248 Legal enforcement is one possibility.249 Because 
of the FSIA, disappointed investors may obtain a judgment for the 
amount of the defaulted debt and may also enforce the judgment against 
sovereign assets.250 Even if their effort to find and seize sovereign assets 
failed, the attempt itself might disrupt the borrower’s trade relations and 
thereby penalize default.251 Indeed, a borrower might seek to demon- 
strate its credit-worthiness by conferring robust enforcement rights in the 
loan contract, which it could do by including the broadest possible im- 
munity waiver.252 
These arguments suggest that legal enforcement may offer investors   
a powerful sanction for sovereign default. The European sovereign debt 
crisis has only served to reinforce that impression, as policy makers and 
media outlets obsess over whether enforcement rights are too strong, en- 
abling voracious holdout litigants to deny needed debt relief to financial-  
ly distressed governments.253 But are  the  underlying  assumptions  valid? 
A small body of empirical evidence casts doubt. For example, Panizza et 
 
242. No relation. 
243. Kris James Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, Empire, Public Goods, and the Roosevelt 
Corollary 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10729, 2004); see also Ahmed et al., 
supra note 143, at 39–46. 
244. Mitchener & Weidenmeir, supra note 239, at 3. 
245. A similar phenomenon may explain why British colonies were able to borrow in London at 
substantially lower rates than non-colonies.   See  Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, The Empire  Ef-   
fect: The Determinants of Country Risk in the First Age of Globalization, 1880–1913, 66 J. ECON. HIST. 
283, 283 (2006). Not all colonies  were  treated  alike,  of  course,  and  to  the  extent  colonization  con-  
ferred benefits, these were not  divided  equally  among  the  colonies.  See  Olivier  Accominotti  et  al.,  
Black Man’s Burden, White Man’s Welfare: Control, Devolution, and Development in the British Em- 
pire 1880–1914, 14 EUR. REV. ECON. HIST. 47 (2010). 
246. Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 238, at 157. 
247. See STURZENEGGER & ZETTELMEYER, supra note 2, at 31–32. 
248. For example, lenders might deny access to trade credit or might convince their government      
to impose trade sanctions. See Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 238, at 158–59; Mark Gersovitz, Trade, 
Capital Mobility and Sovereign Immunity 4 (Research Program in Dev. Studies, Discussion Paper, No. 
108, 1983). 
249. Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 238, at 174; Gersovitz, supra note 248, at 1–3. 
250. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1610 (2012). 
251. Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 238, at 174; Gersovitz, supra note 248, at 1–3. The borrower can 
try to keep its assets away from creditors, but it is costly to do so.  See Bratton & Gulati, supra note   
135, at 15–16; Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 238, at 174–75. 
252. Cf. Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 238, at 174 (noting that “prospective sovereign debtors 
[may] court creditors by strengthening creditors’ rights in default”); see also Weidemaier & Gelpern, 
supra note 141 (discussing embargo effect of court judgments). 
253. See supra note 20. 
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al. studied whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1992 decision in Republic 
of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc.254 altered the probability of sovereign de- 
fault.255 They viewed Weltover as significant because the Court’s decision 
finally established that bond issuance was a commercial act for which 
(due to changes in sovereign immunity law) foreign sovereigns could be 
sued in U.S. courts.256 In other work, Ahmed et al. studied litigation by 
vulture funds257 and found that successful enforcement actions had no 
discernible effect on bond yields.258 These studies suggest that legal en- 
forcement rights are of little use to investors.259 But they are also subject 
to methodological limitations whose significance becomes apparent in 
light of the evidence presented in Part III. 
Take, for example, studies that assign significance to the Supreme 
Court’s 1992 Weltover decision.260 From the standpoint of an investor in 
sovereign bonds, the decision would have been significant if it clarified 
uncertainty about whether sovereigns remained immune from suit in 
U.S. courts.261 Under the FSIA, foreign sovereigns are not immune from 
suit when they have engaged in commercial activity with a U.S. nexus.262 
By clarifying that bond issuance was a commercial act and that the act of 
making payments in the United States satisfied the nexus requirement, 
Weltover would have removed the uncertainty (had there been any).263 
But was there uncertainty? The evidence presented in Part III indi- 
cates not. Recall that the FSIA extends jurisdiction to lawsuits arising out 
of a foreign sovereign’s commercial activities and to suits in which the 
sovereign has previously waived its immunity.264 Thus, the question in 
Weltover mattered only for bonds that did not already include a waiver of 
immunity from suit.265 And as Part III demonstrated, virtually all bonds 
 
 
254. 504 U.S. 607 (1992). 
255. Panizza et al., supra note 127, at 670. 
256. See id. at 670 n.29. 
257. “Vulture funds” are distressed debt investors. See Cashing in on the Crash, THE ECONOMIST 
(Aug. 23, 2007), available at http://www.economist.com/node/9687782. In the sovereign debt context, 
vulture funds buy distressed debt and, rather than participate in restructurings, attempt to recover the    
full face value of the bonds through litigation. See generally David Bosco, The Debt Frenzy, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (June 11, 2007), available at http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2007/06/11/the_debt_frenzy. 
258. Ahmed et al., supra note 143, at 45–46. 
259. See Panizza et al., supra note 127, at 670. 
260. See Ahmed et al., supra note 143, at 42; Panizza et al., supra note 127, at 670. 
261. Thus, Panizza et al. note that, because of Weltover, “sovereign immunity no longer plays an 
important role in shielding sovereign debtors from creditor suits.”  Panizza et al., supra  note 127, at  
654. Ahmed et al. note that Weltover’s holding meant that “[s]overeign immunity . . . did not auto- 
matically apply” to lawsuits arising out of sovereign debt obligations. Ahmed et al., supra note 143, at 
42. 
262. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2012). 
263. See Panizza et al., supra note 127, at 670 n.29. 
264. See supra note 3; see also supra Part II.A.3–4. 
265. In theory, the question might have mattered for bonds that waived immunity from suit but 
did not waive immunity from execution. An investor who held one of these bonds and who had ob- 
tained a judgment against the sovereign could enforce the judgment under the FSIA only against as- 
sets “used for the commercial activity upon which” the investor had based the lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1610(a)(2) (2012). By holding that bond issuance was a commercial activity, Weltover implicitly  
made clear that the investor could enforce the judgment against any assets that had been “used for” 
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contained such a waiver by the late 1970s.266 Holders of these bonds had 
little reason to care about the doctrinal question at issue in Weltover, for 
U.S. courts plainly had jurisdiction over any lawsuit they might file.267 
Another way to put this methodological point is to say that no as- 
sessment  of sovereign  immunity  law’s impact can be  complete  unless  it 
takes contract terms into account. Sanctions-based theories of sovereign 
debt recognize that the utility of litigation (if it has utility) is in part a 
function of contract terms, which can bestow greater or lesser enforce- 
ment rights.268 If legal enforcement matters to investors, the market 
should react differently to bonds that waive immunity from suit,269 bonds 
that waive immunity from both suit and execution,270 and bonds that con- 
tain no waiver at all.271 If legal enforcement does not matter, the market 
should largely ignore these and other differences in how bonds approach 
the subject of dispute resolution.272 
The evidence presented in Part III highlights these methodological 
limitations of existing studies. Indirectly, however, it reinforces their 
skepticism about the potency of legal enforcement. If it is to be a mean- 
ingful weapon, litigation must allow investors to seize the sovereign’s as- 
sets or disrupt its trade.273 This means investors must do more than ob- 
tain a judgment; they must find a way to enforce it. Yet contracting 
practices around the time of the FSIA suggest that investors had little in- 
terest in making the effort. Until the 1990s, waivers of immunity from 
execution were largely absent from sovereign bonds governed by New 
York law (Figure 1).274 Instead, post-FSIA bonds included only waivers 
 
that activity.   Perhaps the doctrinal clarity was welcome, but the investor had a bigger problem: No   
such assets existed. See supra note 130. 
266. See supra Figure 1. 
267. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2012). Thus, although Weltover may have been followed by an in- 
crease in lawsuits against sovereign debtors, see Ahmed et al., supra note 143, at 42, it is unlikely that 
the Court’s sovereign immunity ruling was responsible. 
268. See, e.g., Bulow & Rogoff, supra note 238, at 174. 
269. See, e.g., REPUBLIC OF S. AFR. 7 3/8% NOTES DUE APRIL 25, 2012, PROSPECTUS 
SUPPLEMENT, at S-4 (2002) (“The South African government will irrevocably submit to the jurisdic- 
tion of the Federal and State courts in The City of New York, and will irrevocably waive any immunity 
from the jurisdiction (including sovereign immunity but not any immunity from execution or attach- 
ment or process in the nature thereof) of such courts . . . .”). 
270. See, e.g., MERRILL LYNCH INTERNATIONAL, supra note 170, at 104 (2009) (“To the extent 
that the Republic may in any jurisdiction claim or acquire for itself or its assets immunity (sovereign or 
otherwise) from suit, execution, attachment . . . or other legal process . . . the Republic irrevoca- 
bly . . . waives, such immunity, to the fullest extent permitted by the laws of such jurisdiction.”). 
271. Russian bonds, for example. 
272. In a separate project (with Guangya Liu), I undertake such an analysis, and the results are 
consistent with studies that dismiss the relevance of sovereign immunity law. As Part III made clear, 
virtually all modern sovereign bonds waive immunity from suit. Bonds vary, however, in whether they 
waive immunity from execution. See supra Part III. If legal enforcement matters, the market should 
price this variance, but it seemingly does not. Adjusting for the issuer’s rating and the presence of 
other contract terms known to influence bond yields, we find that variance in immunity-related terms 
does not affect yield spreads. 
273. See, e.g., Gersovitz, supra note 248, at 2–3. 
274. To be sure, an investor who obtained a judgment from a U.S. court could try to enforce the 
judgment against assets located in other jurisdictions. In such a case, the investor’s enforcement rights 
would be determined by the sovereign immunity law of the jurisdiction where the assets were located. 
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of immunity from suit. These were arguably unnecessary, for the FSIA 
itself might have conferred jurisdiction over bond claims.275 In any event, 
they did nothing to solve the problem of execution, at least against assets 
located in the United States.276 
This does not refute sanctions-based theories of enforcement. For 
one thing, lenders may have other ways to impose sanctions after a de- 
fault.277 For another, the law continues to develop. Recent developments 
in federal court in New York suggest that, under the right circumstances, 
courts might develop effective injunctive remedies.278 In the FSIA’s 
wake, however, it seems that market participants were skeptical of the 
value of legal enforcement. And this raises a puzzle that implicates ques- 
tions of contract theory: why would contracts have shifted as they did af- 
ter the statute was enacted? 
 
B. What Prompts Boilerplate to Change? 
Although the post-FSIA shift in bond contracts did little to improve 
bondholders’ enforcement rights, it was a major event from a contracting 
perspective. Sovereign bond contracts are drafted by lawyers at major 
global firms, involve transactions worth many hundreds of millions of 
dollars, and (in the modern era) are actively traded by sophisticated 
players in secondary markets. Thus, it is tempting to believe that their 
terms represent optimal solutions to the problems that concern the mar- 
ket.279 In fact, however, sovereign bonds are highly standardized con- 
tracts that rarely change in material ways.280 
 
In at least some cases, however, borrowers would have conducted substantial trade with parties in the 
US, and bond contracts left investors unable to interfere with these relationships. 
275. See supra text accompanying notes 213–14. 
276. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text. 
277. See supra note 248. 
278. A federal judge in New York has recently issued an injunction forbidding Argentina to pay 
holders of its restructured debt unless it also pays holdout creditors. This injunction was affirmed on 
appeal. See supra note 8. Litigation is ongoing, and the full details of the injunction have yet to be 
worked out. However, if courts were to routinely issue such injunctions (and could find a way to en- 
force them), the dynamic between sovereign borrowers and their creditors might change dramatically. 
For extensive coverage of these ongoing developments, see Joseph Cotterill, PARI PASSU SAGA (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2013), http://ftalphaville.ft.com/tag/pari-passu-saga/; Anna Gelpern, Postings by Anna 
Gelpern, CREDIT SLIPS, http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/GelpernAuthor.html (last visited Oct. 22, 
2013); Mark Weidemaier, Postings by Mark Weidemaier, CREDIT SLIPS, http://www.creditslips.org/ 
creditslips/WeidemaierAuthor.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2013). 
279. See, e.g., Clifford W. Smith Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of 
Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 123 (1979) (noting that contract terms that have survived over 
long periods of time likely represent efficient—or at least not harmful—solutions). 
280. Many observers have explored the  causes  and  effects  of  standardization  on  contracts,  includ- 
ing Stephen M. Bainbridge, Mandatory Disclosure: A Behavioral Analysis, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023 
(2000); Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33  FLA. ST. U. L.  
REV. 651 (2006); William W. Bratton, Jr., The Economics and Jurisprudence of Convertible Bonds, 
1984 WIS. L. REV. 667, 689 (1984); Choi & Gulati, supra note 124, at 947; Steven  M. Davidoff, The  
Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481 (2009); Charles J. Goetz & Robert  E. Scott, The  Lim- 
its of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 
73 CALIF. L. REV. 261 (1985); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming),  available  at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2216902;   Marcel  Kahan 
& Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (Or the Economics of 
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A number of factors may explain the reluctance to make changes.281 
For example, standardization may reduce lawyers’ incentives to produce 
custom terms. Because the lawyer cannot anticipate every contingency, 
it is possible that the term will fail to accomplish its intended objective.282 
When this happens, clients may judge the lawyer who designed the cus- 
tom term more harshly than a lawyer who used the market standard em- 
ployed by everyone else.283 In addition, secondary market traders prefer 
standardization; they do not want to invest the time and energy necessary 
to evaluate the implications of novel contract language.284 Like other 
mass producers, the large law firms that create sovereign bond contracts 
tend to build “routines that are dedicated to the mass production of ho- 
mogeneous goods.”285 
The fact that sovereign bonds are resistant to change, however, does 
not mean that change never occurs.286 As an empirical matter, the litera- 
ture has identified several contexts in which changes have been intro- 
duced into bond contracts. Significant innovations have occasionally ap- 
peared in bonds issued by marginal issuersi.e., smaller countries that 
are not in the market spotlight.287 But the governments and lawyers in- 
volved in these transactions do not trumpet the innovation, and it largely 
passes unnoticed in the broader market.288 Lawyers also appear to en- 
gage in widespread “tinkering,” making modest changes to existing lan- 
guage but not introducing significant variation or adding new clauses.289 
These small changes fail to attract the attention of market participants. 
Neither of these contexts involves the widespread adoption of a new 
contract term by most issuers in the market. On relatively rare occa- 
sions, however, such wholesale changes do occur, often after a period of 
foment and experimentation.290 The general understanding is that this 
 
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997); Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Contract Negotia- 
tion: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1583 (1998); Barak 
Richman, Contracts  Meet  Henry  Ford, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77 (2011); Peter B. Rutledge & Christo-  
pher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses?: The Use of Arbitration Clauses After Concepcion and 
Amex (draft dated Aug. 5, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=2306268; and D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REV. 315 (2005). 
281. See Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 280, at 655–70; Hoffman, supra note 280 at 37–44; 
Rutledge & Drahozal, supra note 280, at 18–22. 
282. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: 
Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 WASH. U. L. Q. 347, 355–58 (1996). 
283. See id. at 356. 
284. See, e.g., Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 942–43 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that uni- 
formity of contract terms makes it easier for investors and advisors to compare issues). 
285. See Richman, supra note 280, at 82. 
286. Stephen J. Choi et al., The Dynamics of Contract Evolution 2, 9–11 (Univ. of Chi. Inst. for 
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happens because public-sector actors have pushed market participants to 
accept the new term,291 or because a major shock, such as that associated 
with global financial crisis, has unsettled investors’ perceptions of risk 
and caused them to demand new terms.292 According to theory it takes a 
major event of this sort to overcome the inherent inertia that character- 
izes bond contracts.293 But the post-FSIA contract shift does not conform 
neatly to this prediction. There were few defaults in the 1970s, and most 
occurred late in the decade after waivers of immunity from suit had al- 
ready been introduced into bond contracts.294 By the time of the Latin 
American debt crisis of the 1980s, the new contract terms were well es- 
tablished in both New York and London.295 No obvious external shock 
occurred to alter investors’ perceptions of default risk, nor was there any 
explicit government pressure to introduce sovereign immunity waivers 
into bond contracts. What did happen was the enactment of the FSIA. 
But if this “shocked” any participants in the bond markets, it does not 
seem to have been the investors. As we have seen, there is little evidence 
that the FSIA caused investors to re-assess the risk associated with for- 
eign government bonds. 
To be clear, the post-FSIA shift is not fundamentally incompatible 
with existing theories of contract change. It suggests, however, that a 
wider range of forces may disrupt existing contracting routines. Rather 
than alter the perceptions of investors, the FSIA arguably increased the 
salience of legal enforcement to the players involved in documenting 
sovereign loan transactions. These include, at a minimum, the parties 
who produce the documents underlying the bond issue: the issuer, its un- 




291. See Weidemaier, supra note 34, at 20–21; Choi et al., supra note 286, at 11. 
292. Choi et al., supra note 286, at 10; Stephen J. Choi et al., supra note 179, at 17. The theory 
draws from the literature on organizational behavior and innovation, positing that technological ad- 
vances and other exogenous shocks disrupt established practices and present opportunities for innova- 
tion. For discussion of this literature as applied to contracts, see Richman, supra note 280. 
293. See Choi et al., supra note 179. 
294. Most of the default episodes involved bank debt rather than bonds. For the timing of default 
episodes, see Borensztein & Panizza, supra note 127, at 43 tbl. A1. Mexico’s payment standstill in 
1982 initiated a widespread debt crisis involving at least seventy default episodes. Id. at 7. In addition 
to a wave of defaults on commercial loans, Nigeria, Yugoslavia, Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Gua- 
temala, Panama, and others defaulted on bond debt. Id. at 41–48 tbl. A1; see also Fisch & Gentile, 
supra note 145, at 1054–55; LEX RIEFFEL, RESTRUCTURING SOVEREIGN DEBT: THE CASE FOR AD 
HOC MACHINERY 154 (2003). 
295. As an example, between 1978 and 1982 (the year of Mexico’s default and the onset of the 
crisis, see supra note 294), fifteen of the seventeen New York law bonds in the dataset included waiv- 
ers of immunity. (The exceptions were Mexico and Venezuela.) A similar pattern holds for English 
law bonds, which almost uniformly incorporated waivers of immunity after 1977. By contrast, waivers 
of immunity from execution might plausibly be attributed to the shock of the Latin American debt 
crisis of the 1980s or the financial crisis beginning in the mid-1990s. On the influence of these shocks 
more generally, see Choi et al., supra note 179. 
296. Investors are not directly involved in negotiating the terms of sovereign bond contracts. The 
issuer, its underwriters, and their respective lawyers negotiate the details, and investors typically re- 
view disclosure documents that describe key terms in detail. See Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 163, at 
1637 & n.43. 
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The statute was disruptive for these playersunlike the non- 
statutory developments that began with the Tate Letterbecause it 
made dispute resolution impossible to ignore. During the 1950s and 
1960s, developments in the law of sovereign immunity had little to do 
with sovereign lending, much less bond lending.297 No influential court or 
other authoritative legal actor had declared that waivers of sovereign 
immunity would be enforced. By contrast, the treatment of sovereign 
loans featured prominently in the debate leading up to the enactment of 
the FSIA,298 and this could not have escaped the attention of lawyers in- 
volved in sovereign bond deals. After the statute formally established 
the enforceability of sovereign immunity waivers, informed lawyers 
could no longer avoid raising the subject during negotiations over the 
terms of a bond issuance. Put a bit differently: an informed lawyer surely 
would have felt the obligation to do something in response to such a sali- 
ent legal development. 
Although this is speculation, it is easy to see how the FSIA could 
have altered the negotiating dynamic underlying sovereign bond transac- 
tions, even if it did not depart radically from existing law or represent a 
major development from an enforcement perspective. As I have noted, 
other types of government loans already included immunity waivers, but 
sovereign countries were reluctant to agree to these terms when issuing 
bonds.299 Before the FSIA, there may have been little reason for banks 
and their lawyers to focus on this point. Investors, after all, had demon- 
strated little interest in the subject of dispute resolution. As evidence of 
their disinterest, sales documents for bonds issued between 1950 and 
1976 generally did not discuss legal enforcement at all. If investors had 
cared about enforcement rights, they might have wondered whether the 
Tate Letter made it feasible to sue a foreign issuer, or whether the evolv- 
ing law of sovereign immunity made it worthwhile to include a waiver of 
the issuer’s immunity from suit.300 Had they been interested in such mat- 
ters, the detailed sales documents that were distributed to prospective 
investors might have addressed the subject. But this did not happen.301 
After the FSIA, however, it would have been harder to justify the 
different treatment of direct loans and sovereign bonds.302 And once the 
 
297. As noted, the Tate Letter and other developments were primarily concerned with other 
kinds of state commercial activity. See supra note 224. Moreover, most sovereign lending during the 
era was made through governments or multilateral financial institutions. See supra notes 83–84. 
298. See supra text accompanying notes 85–89, 229–33. 
299. See supra text accompanying note 166. 
300. See supra Part II.A.3. 
301. Likewise, if investors had cared about legal enforcement, one might have expected a wave of 
litigation to ensue after the defaults that took place in the 1980s and again in the 1990s. See supra note 
294. These defaults, however, provoked remarkably little litigation despite the amounts at stake. (For 
a discussion of litigation during this era, see Fisch & Gentile, supra note 145 at 1077–80.) What the 
defaults seemingly did provoke is more contract change. In the New York market, waivers of immuni- 
ty from execution began to appear after Mexico’s payment standstill in 1982 and became common in 
the mid-1990s. See Figure 1; see also Choi et al., supra note 179, at 20 tbl. 1A. 
302. Direct loans are made by large commercial banks. There are relatively few of these, and 
they are potent economic and political actors. Their leverage may have given them reason to believe 
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statute injected the subject of legal enforcement into bond negotiations, 
fairly compelling logic supported including a waiver of immunity in the 
bond contract: it certainly couldn’t hurt investors to have one. At the 
same time, investors’ relative disinterest in the subject may have made it 
unnecessary for the underwriters’ lawyers to bargain for significant con- 
cessions, such as waivers of immunity from execution, for which issuers 
might have demanded concessions in return. Viewed in this manner, the 
post-FSIA contract shift was a formal, largely symbolic, reaction to a de- 
velopment that increased the salience of legal enforcement for the bank- 
ers and lawyers who bear primary responsibility for structuring sovereign 
bond issues and thinking about the consequences of default. 
This understanding dovetails with other, largely overlooked devel- 
opments in the sovereign debt markets. These changes often took place 
after external events increased the salience of a particular contract term. 
For example, in the early 2000s, the U.S. government cajoled issuers in 
the New York market to adopt a new contract termCollective Action 
Clauses (CACs)designed to facilitate the restructuring of sovereign 
debt.303 Their efforts placed CACs front and center in global discussions 
of sovereign bond contracts. Although the intervention was targeted 
only at the New York market, it appears to have had the unintended ef- 
fect of provoking changes to standardized contracts in other markets.304 
In similar fashion, by placing legal enforcement front and center in dis- 
cussions of relations between private creditors and foreign sovereigns, 
the FSIA may have provided an impetus to modify contracts that were, 
under ordinary circumstances, supposed to be boilerplate. 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
At first glance, the swift incorporation of immunity waivers into 
sovereign bonds seems to illustrate the power of doctrine and the im- 
portance of legal enforcement rights. But upon deeper inquiry, an en- 
tirely different set of lessons emerges. One lesson is a cautionary tale 
about the limits of doctrine. The shift from the absolute to the restrictive 
theory of sovereign immunity was nothing short of a doctrinal revolution. 
But revolutions have limits, and, at least in the context of sovereign debt, 
this one’s were dramatic indeed. Neither the FSIA nor the contract shift 
that followed it created a regime in which investors had meaningful en- 
forcement rights. 
As a matter of contract theory, however, the post-FSIA shift was a 
major event. Strikingly, the shift occurred not because sovereign immun- 
 
the issuer would willingly submit to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts if it had previously agreed to do so. 
(Relatedly, the banks’ political clout may have given them some confidence that the State Department 
would decline to recognize and allow an immunity claim if the issuer made one.) Dispersed bond- 
holders, by contrast, had less leverage and arguably depended more on formal enforcement rights. 
Once the FSIA made clear that immunity waivers were enforceable, this justification for treating 
bondholders differently disappeared. 
303. See generally Gelpern & Gulati, supra note 163. 
304. For extended discussion of this episode, see Weidemaier, supra note 34. 
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ity law had changed but because those changes were codified. This unu- 
sual pattern, which occurred without pressure from government officials 
and during a time of relative placidity in the sovereign debt markets, 
does not map easily onto standard models of contract change. The best 
explanation, it seems, is that contracts changed because the statute made 
legal enforcement salient to the players involved in documenting bond 
transactions. Investors, by contrast, were largely unmoved by the revolu- 
tion in sovereign immunity law. For them, neither the radical doctrinal 
changes, nor the introduction of contract terms related to legal enforce- 
ment, played much of a role in the broader drama of sovereign debt. 
 
APPENDIX 1 
Issuers of bonds listed on NYSE or governed by New York law, 
by frequency of appearance in dataset 
Mexico: 47 (7.5%) Peru: 9 (1.4%) Grenada : 2 (0.3%) 
Brazil: 42 (6.7%) New Zealand: 9 (1.4%) Bosnia: 2 (0.3%) 
Italy: 37 (5.9%) Lebanon: 9 (1.4%) Bahamas: 2 (0.3%) 
Australia: 30 (4.8%) Austria: 9 (1.4%) Aruba: 2 (0.3%) 
Venezuela: 26 (4.1%) Poland: 8 (1.3%) Vietnam: 1 (<0.1%) 
Uruguay: 25 (4.0%) Korea: 8 (1.3%) Spain: 1 (<0.1%) 
Philippines: 25 (4.0%) Israel: 8 (1.3%) Rhodesia: 1 (<0.1%) 
Turkey: 24 (3.8%) Denmark: 8 (1.3%) Kazakhstan: 1 (<0.1%) 
Colombia: 24 (3.8%) Qatar: 7 (1.1%) Nova Scotia: 1 (<0.1%) 
South Africa: 23 (3.7%) Costa Rica: 7 (1.1%) Netherlands: 1 (<0.1%) 
Norway: 21 (3.4%) Belgium: 7 (1.1%) Micronesia: 1 (<0.1%) 
Panama: 19 (3.0%) Egypt: 5 (0.8%) Ivory Coast: 1 (<0.1%) 
Argentina: 18 (2.9%) Bulgaria: 5 (0.8%) Iraq: 1 (<0.1%) 
Jamaica: 17 (2.7%) Belize: 5 (0.8%) Iceland: 1 (<0.1%) 
El Salvador: 14 (2.2%) Trinidad & Tobago: 4 (0.6%) Greece: 1 (<0.1%) 
Finland: 12 (1.9%) Japan: 4 (0.6%) Gabon: 1 (<0.1%) 
China: 12 (1.9%) Hungary: 4 (0.6%) Congo: 1 (<0.1%) 
Chile: 11 (1.8%) Thailand: 3 (0.5%) Canada: 1 (<0.1%) 
Sweden: 10 (1.6%) Guatemala : 3 (0.5%) Belgian Congo: 1 (<0.1%) 
Indonesia: 10 (1.6%) Ecuador: 3 (0.5%)  
Portugal: 9 (1.4%) United Kingdom: 2 (.3%)  
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APPENDIX 2 
Sovereign Bond Issues (1945-present) 
 
Decade N Percent of Total Issuances 
1945-1949 8 1.3% 
1950-1954 6 1.0% 
1955-1959 28 4.4% 
1960-1964 25 4.0% 
1965-1969 30 4.8% 
1970-1974 14 2.2% 
1975-1979 44 7.0% 
1980-1984 11 1.7% 
1985-1989 11 1.7% 
1990-1994 25 4.0% 
1995-1999 84 13.3% 
2000-2004 169 26.8% 
2005-present 175 27.8% 
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